



THE
FIRST PART
OF THE CONSIDERATION OF HUMAN Condition:

WHEREIN IS CONTAINED
the Morall Consideration of a mans selfe:
*as what, who, and what manner
of man he is.*

Written by I. P. Esquier.

Amo vt invenio.



AT OXFORD,

Printed by Joseph Barnes, and are to be sold in
Pauls Church-yard, at the signe of
the Bible. 1600.

THE
FIRST PART
OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THE
NATION OF HAV

THE SECOND PART
OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THE
NATION OF HAV

THE THIRD PART
OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THE
NATION OF HAV



THE FOURTH PART
OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THE
NATION OF HAV



TO THE RIGHT HONORABLE,
HIS VERY ESPECIAL GOOD LORD,
THOMAS Baron of Buckhurst, Lord Treasurer of Eng-
land, one of the LL. of her Majesties most Honorable
privie Counsaile, Knight of the Honorable Order of
the Garter, and Chawncellour of the Universitie of
Oxford, I. P. wiseth increase of honour
and eternall felicitie.



N the fore-front of this small and
slender building, many things are
wanting (Right Honorable, and my
most honored Lord) which through
the distraction of busines, the short-
nes of time, and the vnskillfulnes of
the builder could not be finished, as
it was purposed. For the same for-
tune falleth out many times vnto writers of bookes, as
doth vnto Builders of houses: when as in both, at the be-
ginning of the worke, they, which frame the first founda-
tion and plot, doe propose vnto themselues lesse labor
and expence of time, then in the ende they must bestow,
before it be fully finished: So, sometimes they are con-
strained to leaue their well-begunne labours without any
ende, or else rudely and roughly to finish the same. Such
is the conclusion in the first part of this poore cottage of
Consideration, which I haue builded like an vnexperien-
ced workeman, and which I haue presumed humbly to

offer vnto your Lordships Honorable patronage, not so much for the worth of the worke, as to testifie the acknowledgement of my most zealous faith and affection vnto your Lordshippe, being therevnto bound by your Lordships honorable favour and furtherauncés. For which I can yeelde no other offering, but the fruits of this my yet vnperfected labours, with the continuance of my vowed devotion (next to my most gracious Sovereigne) to doe your Lordship service. And so I humbly end, with my praiers for your Lordships preservation and increase of honours. *Haroldston the 16. of Novemb. 1600.*

*Your Lordships most bounden, and
ever to be commanded,*

L. P.



To the indifferent and friendly Reader.



Know that they, which publish any thinge in writing vnto the worlde, doe submitte themselves vnto common censure. And I am not ignorāt, that as it is more easie to finde a fault in things done, the to doe the same so substantially, as no faulte shall be founde therewith: so is it more easie to amend, then to make. If therefore I haue erred in any thing (as I acknowledge no such excellency in mee, but that I may easily mistake) Let accustomed community of erring excuse me amongst others. For, humanū est errare. And if he that peruseth this Tracte, do find any faultes therein, I shall desire the direction of his better iudgment to amend them; which I vvillesteeme as a very greate favour. I commend this first parte of Consideration to thy honest and discreet construction. It containeth the Morall Consideration of a mans selfe. There are three other pointes of Consideration by mee intended to bee published: the next whereof is the Politicall Consideration of those thinges, that are vnder vs. The thirde is the Naturall Consideration of those thinges, that are about vs. The fourth and laste is the Metaphysicall Consideration of those thinges, that are aboue vs. This first, which is here published, I haue offered as a taste of my labours, and a triall of thy good or ill allowance; if it bee accepted with

To the indifferent and friendly Reader.

as good meaning, as it was offered, and that the honorable Personage, to whom this is dedicated (and to whom all the rest of my labors are due) doe not direct the contrarie; I will proceede as speedily, as conveniently I can, to publish the rest. But if this yeelde thee any distaste, or bee disliked; it is but so much labour lost in that, which is already done, and so much labour saved, in that, which should be hereafter done. So as thou wishest well, farewell. From my house at Haroldsstone the 16. of November.

The well willer of them, that wish well.

JAMES PERROTT.



THE CONSIDERATION of humane Condition.

CHAP. I.

*How necessary, and what Con-
sideration is.*



Plants haue but a *Vegetative* faculty, and beasts haue but a *Sensitive* power to produce those effects which nature (or rather the guider of natures workes) hath ordained them to execute in their severall kindes: but man alone (above all the rest) hath the most excellent helpe of *Reason* to order his affections, and govern his thoughts, and his deedes. Why should not man then (so farre exceeding all other creatures in this most admirable and powerfull gift of *Reason*) expell thereby all the perverse passions, the beastiall lustes, and the fonde desires of the minde: which many times make him inferiour to the most vile and most contemptible creatures of the world? If we would know the reason of this so great an evil, it is because he doth seldome accompany his actions with *Consideration*, which is the chiefe ruler and governesse vnder *Reason*: for where *Consideration* doth not first open the dore, and make the first entrance into any action of accompt, there commonly the successe is such as breedeth but sorrow, shame, and confusion: and where due *Consideration* commeth before, and with our deedes, it is seldome seene there, but that the event falleth out according to our expectation. This being so, it were not amisse to looke somewhat into this glasse of *Consideration*, therein to behold (as neere as we may) the mappe and character of humane Condition.

A

And

The consideration

And because consideration is founde to bee a matter of so great moment in directing the course of every mans life, as that it may iustly be called the loadstone of mans life : it were convenient first to know what this consideration is, before wee endeavour to iudge of the effects thereof.

Confide-
ration,

Cogitatio.
Meditatio.

Contem-
plation,
Delibera-
tion.

Consideration (as *Thomas Aquinas* doth define it) is the operation of the vnderstanding, or the processe of Reason pertaining to the contemplation of the trueth. *Consideration* therefore is more generall, & more profitable then is *Cogitation*, or *Meditation*. For *Cogitation* is but a particular power of collecting individuall intentions : and *Meditation*, but an inwarde beholding, busied in the inquisition of thinges : but this our *Consideration*, is the operation of all the vnderstanding : as hath bene already defined. Likewise some alleadge that *Contemplation* belongeth onely to divine thinges. And *Deliberation* properly appertaineth to humane and political matters: but this our *Consideration* doeth comprehend both, or at the least is conuersant in both.

CHAP. 2.

Why some men are more given to Consideration then others.

THe causes that some men are more deliberate, and more consideratiue in their actions then others, are diuerse: either proceeding from the well or euill situation of the interior sences; or arising from the good, or badde constitution of their complexions; or coming of the company that they most commonly keepe, and the exercise that they do chiefly vse.

The first
cause.

As touching the first, which is the situation and due proportion of the interior sences: how much that doth auile to the attaining of Consideration, by this we may conceiue; that as the sences haue their seuerall seates in the braines, so do they receiue their temperature, according to the temperature of that parte, where-

wherein they are placed, and there-after are men made apt or vnapt to enter into due Consideration.

As for example, the first of the interiour senses (which both Philosophers and Phisitions doe call the *common sense*, because it is common to all the exteriour senses to conuay their shapes and formes vnto it) is placed in the forepart of the braine, having a severall cell or roome, in which the five nerues (coming from the five exteriour senses) doe meete, if this bee not conveniently moist, and of a convenient quantity, it cannot receiue the right shape of these, and consequently the other senses cannot concur to consider aright thereof.

1. Common sense.

The second sense is called the *Imaginative sense*, which also is placed in the fore-part of the braine next vnto the Common sense: and the office thereof is to containe & retaine the formes of those things, which the exteriour senses doe present vnto the Common sense: for that the Common sense of it selfe consisteth meereley of moisture, which is apt to receiue, but not to retaine: and this Imaginative sense is composed of drinesse, which conserveth the figures of things more firmly: therefore if this sense hath not also his right quality and condition, the true objects of things sensible cannot be well conserved to be considered of.

2. Imaginative sense. Although Aristotle maketh no mention of this Imaginative sense, yet I thought good herein to follow other Philosophers, who doe make this distinct frō the other three.

The next is called the *Phantasie* (or as some say) the *Estimative sense*, which is placed in the middle part of the braine, betwixt the Common sense and the Memory: this sense serueth to compose, to deuide, and to distinguish of the shapes, which are presented vnto the Common sense, and preserved by the Imaginative sense; and this sense is seated in the middle parte of the heade, as a cell to receiue those figures from the Common sense and Imaginative, as to take them againe out of the Memory being the store-houise of the head: it is composed of heat, by which it is in much motion, and into it doe resort all the moving spirites; but if it doe exceede an ordinary temperature of heate, it maketh too much motion in the braine, and leaueth no liberty to a seled Consideration.

3. Phantasie.

The last of the interiour senses, is the *Memory*, which is pla-

4. Memory.

ced in the hinder parte of the head: the cell and situation of this sense is more dry, and somewhat harder then the rest of the braine, because (as it was saide before) that drynes is the cause of Retention, so this sense beeing made to retaine the shape of things, vvhich are delivered from the Common sense vnto the Imaginative, but also the Memory must retaine the shapes of intentions, vvhich the Imaginative doeth present vnto it: so as it is truely tearmed the Treasury of the minde: and therefore if the Memory haue not his iust proportion of drynes neither exceeding nor vwanting much thereof, then it cannot retaine well, and so the Consideration (which is not only a Messenger, but as it were a Counsellour betwixt the Memory & the rest of the Senses) cannot receiue his right course.

The second
cause,

The second cause, vvhich we saide first did much helpe, or hinder our Consideration, is the Constitution of the fowre *Complexions* according to the operation of the fowre *Elements* in mans body: for the Phylosophers affirme that the temperature of the minde, followeth the temperature of the body: and the temperature of the body consisteth in the Composition of the fowre *Complexions*, vvhich receiue and participate the qualities of the fowre *Elements*; as for example; the *sanguine Complexion* doth participate with the Element of the aire, which is by nature hotte and moist: these two qualities in the *sanguine Complexion* do worke this operation, that it causeth a ready conceipt, but it doth diuert the mind from any deepe Consideration.

Also the *Phlegmaticke Complexion*, consisting of colde and moisture, hath this property, that by reason of over much coldnes, it doth dull the spirites, whereby they cannot aptly conceiue, and because of much moisture, it cannot retaine what is receiued: therefore it is vnapt for Consideration.

3

The *cholericke* which doth consist of heate and drynes is somewhat more apte to conceiue then the *Phlegmaticke*, and yet in that the heate is not mixed with either colde or moisture to qualifie the same, it doth not plant any firme lesure to consider what is to be done.

4

The *melancholick Complexion*, that is made of colde and dry-

drynes, (vvhich in their natures doe make a better mixture of moderation) doth plante a firme leasure to consider what is to be done, and therefore is fittest for Consideration.

Besides this absolute predomination of each of these first foure *Qualities* in mens bodies, vvhereby they are made either apte or vnable for Consideration sometimes; there is a mixture of the *Complexion* in one body in such sorte that it can hardly be saide which of two hath the greatest power or predominancy, and then there is many times the best temperature in the body, and consequently the minde is more apte for Consideration and the life of man is longer preferued. As for example; vvhen the *cholericke* and *phlegmaticke* Complexions are so mixed, that the *cholericke* hath somewhat the superiour power, and the *phlegmaticke* is proportioned vnto it, then the drynes of the one doth somewhat qualifie the over-much moistnes of the other, vvhereby this temperature maketh a man more apte for Consideration. So *sanguine* and *melancholy*, being mixed in such sort as the *sanguine* in some small degree doth surmount the *melancholy*, it maketh a more even proportion of the foure first *Qualities* in one body: by which composition (and as they call it a Communicating of the contrary qualities in the foure Elementes) there is made a reconciliation of their contrary effectes, and a coniunction of their forces, whereby the minde of man is more fitt for Consideration.

The thirde
cause.

The third cause which helpeth or hindereth Consideration is (as hath beene before alleadged) the *Company*, which we keepe, and the *Studies* which we vse: for though these fore-recited causes may be greate helpes or hinderances to our Consideration, as the situation of the senses, and the constitution of the complexions, as being instrumentall causes of Consideration, yet these may bee aptely disposed, and yet Consideration in some sorte may be wanting. For as we see instrumentes, which are excellentie composed, and haue in themselves a verie sweete sounde, if they bee vvell tuned and vvell played on; yet if he that shoulde play thereon doth not perfourme his parte; either by reason of the company, with whome he is, and

doth more attend their actions, then his owne play; or else, by meanes of some other actions he hath in hand, doth not exquisitely vse and exercise his skill; then the instrument, on which he playeth, looseth the sweetnesse of his sounde, and the true vse thereof: so is it in the vse of Consideration; for although the interior senses bee well seated, and the complexions well composed, which are as instrumentes of the minde, yet if the minde it selfe be not by good company and good exercise well settled to Consideration, these instrumentes loose the sweetnesse of their sounde, and the effectes of Consideration by them cannot haue a right course. For prooffe hereof; first, to beginne with company & conversation of good or evil men, how much the one helpeth & the other hindereth Consideration, we may see by the example of sundry younge men, who of their owne dispositions haue bene civill, discrete, and well inclined to Consideration, vntill that they comming into euill company haue by imitating their light behaviour bene brought to be altogether carelesse and vnconsiderate: It is true, that *hee which toucheth pitch, shall bee defiled therewith*, and that he, which keepeth ill company, shall be in the ende carried from all good consideration. For *with the good (as it is said) thou shalt learne goodnesse, and with the perverse thou shalt be perverted*. Again we see on the other side, that the company and conversation of graue, learned & considerate men doth much mooue vs vnto the consideration of their behaviour, and by their example wee learne the like to become considerate as they are: and by the counsaile of such graue men many times the rash and vnstaied humors of youth are tempered and tuned to the right meane & measure of Consideration: as *Catoes* graue conversation was not onely a lanterne, but also a lesson (for all those that knew him) to learne consideration.

The fourth
cause.

Now lastly for exercise, how that doeth helpe or hinder the course of our Consideration, wee may conceiue it by knowing that exercise is of two sortes; either of the body, or of the mind: the exercise of the body we call Labour, the exercise of the mind we call Study. For the first, which is the exercise of the body, we finde

finde that this being moderately vsed maketh the body strong and healthy, whereby the minde is also made more free to full-fill his functions, especially in the course of Consideration: but if the body bee over-laboured, it breedeth a wearinesse and a weakenesse in the partes thereof, whereby also the minde is molested, & lesse at liberty to enter into Cōsideration what ought to be done. Likewise for Study, it hath the like or greater operation, then Labor hath, in making the minde fit or vnfit for Cōsideration: because we haue it in dayly experience, that moderate Study doth inlighten the mind, & kindle the pure bright-shining fire of Consideration. Yea many times it hath the power to diuert mens mindes from evil cogitations, and to convert them vnto the due consideration of themselues and of those thinges, that belonge vnto them. As *Socrates* said vnto a skillful Physiognomer, who tolde him that hee was a man of a wicked disposition, (whereat others laughed knowing the contrary) it is true said *Socrates* which thou tellest me that by nature I was wicked and of a lewd condition, but by my study, learning, and consideration, I haue corrected those euill conditions. So we see that moderate Exercise, and moderate Study doe much auail to the attaining of Consideration, & of those good conditions which do follow Cōsideration. But on the contrary, immoderate Study doth much spende the spirits and weaken the braine, whereby the course of due Consideration is very much hindered.

*Xenoph de
disc. or facit.
Socrat.*

CHAP. 3.

*Vnto what we shoulde apply the scope of our
Consideration.*

NOW having saide somewhat how necessary, and what consideration is, as also what thinges doe most helpe or hinder this Consideration; it commeth next in order to shew vnto what wee ought chiefly to bende the course of our Consideration. Wherein we may beholde by the example of other

other mens behaviours, that most men are very carefull and doe vse very great Consideration in the compassing of those things which they do desire most. As for example, the covetous man doth labour all the power of his Consideration to attaine vnto riches. The ambitious man doth enter into Consideration of no one thing so much, as how to come to preferment, and to obtaine dignities and honour. The lascivious man doth straine the stringes of his Consideration only to compasse his pleasures. So that these men (and others of all conditions) seeme to vse no Consideration in any thing, but only on that, which they desire most, and about which they apply all their care and industry, leaving all other thinges, as matters (in their opinions) of no moment: when as perchance that, vvvhich they so much seeke after, and doe so carefully imploy all their Considerations about, in other mens constructions may be of no such consequence, and worthy of no great Consideration: As the covetous man doth admire why the ambitious do bend their whole Consideration about the seeking of honours, great authority, great names and preheminance: which the covetous accompteth but as blastes of winde, blowne away with the breath of mens mouthes: on the other side, the ambitious man reckoneth of the covetous man, but as of one, that is base minded, because hee bestoweth all his Consideration to procure him wealth without vsing the same to any other purpose then to pinch himselfe and his poore neighbours, not knowing vvho shall enioy them after his decease, or whither hee shall haue them himselfe as long as he liueth. Likewise the lascivious man laugheth at both the covetous man and the ambitious: & they both as much at him, whom they deeme altogether vnconsiderat, in that he hath no other Consideration of any matter, which doeth concerne him most, but only his vaine pleasure, which they can say he doth most commonly purchase with repentance of his time mispent, his health decayed and his hability consumed: so that we see most men doe mislike the course of other mens Considerations, and few doe take the right course themselves of due Consideration, because al do aime at an end, which they

they thinke shoulde bee good vnto themselves: but there is a goodnes, which is in *appearance* onely, but not indeede: and there is a goodnes in *truth*, & in *substance*, without vaine shewe. Now to the attaining of this goodnes (which is true goodnes indeede) ought our Consideration to be directed: and for effecting thereof, we must follow the course & counsell of Bernard in his foure bookes of *Consideration* written to *Eugenius*, vvhome hee vvillett to consider chiefly these foure thinges: first, thy selfe: nexte, those thinges that are vnder thee: then, those thinges that are aboue thee: and lastly, those thinges that are aboue thee. In considering thy selfe (saith he) thou must learne to knowe, What thou art: VVhat thou art: and, VVhat manner of man thou art.

Bernard de
Consid. ad
Eugen.
We ought
to consider
four
thinges.

In considering What thou art, thou shalt find in Nature that thou art a man, that is Reasonable and Mortall: being Mortall, thou maist be sorie: but being Reasonable, thou hast cause to mitigate thy sorrowe.

1

In the consideration of thy selfe VVhat thou arte, thou must finde out the perfect footestepes of thy parentage, thy calling, and thy habilitie.

2

In considering VVhat manner of man thou art, thou shalt seeke out thy naturall inclination, thy conditions, qualities, and the course of thy life. In this sorte doch Bernard beginne a brieft, apte, and an excellent entraunce into the most profitable pointes of Consideration. First, hee beginneth vvith that pointe of Consideration vvhich concerneth the Knowledge of thy selfe, being the beginning of all true knowledge, and without this no knowledge or consideration can profit thee, be it of matters never so exquisite, or of mysteries never so high: For as it doth concerne every man to learne what is done at home, before hee goe abroad: so doth it behoue him to knowe himselfe, before hee looke into others. It is true that many men seeme to knowe many thinges, and yet, not knowing themselves, they knowe nothing at all: or at least, they knowe nothinge in that, which doth most availe them.

3

Concerning these circumstances of Consideration, *Chrysostome* goeth somewhat farther in wordes, though not much farther in effect, then *Bernard* doth. He saith, that it doth behoove euery wise man to consider what himselfe is, what is within him, what is betwixt him, what is aboue him, what is against him, what is before him, and what is after him: all which Considerations (saith *Chrysostome*) bring forth a foure-fold fruit: as; Profit to thy selfe, Charity towards thy neighbours, Contempt of the world, and the love of God. This diuision though it differ somewhat in wordes from the former, yet it is the same in substance and effect.

CHAP. 4.

*The Consideration of thy selfe what thou art
in thy Creation.*

IT is necessary to prosecute the first diuision of the pointes of Consideration, laid downe by *Bernard*, somewhat more particularly then he did, because he applyed all his exhortations therein vnto the person and profession of *Eugenius*, then Pope of Rome, as particular instructions for his place & calling. Therefore it were not amisse in this our Consideration of humane condition, to amplifie somewhat on the condition of humane estate in generall, and of every kinde of estate in particular (as neere as we may) without offence of any, and yet for the instruction of all: observing still and strictly those members of diuision, which this learned Father hath laide down, to direct vs vnto the perfectest pointes of Consideration. To this purpose it becometh to begin with the Creation of man, wherein we may consider what he is: vvhenceof, if any doe aske the Philosophers, they wil deliver diuers contrary opinions: And to beginne with *Anaximander* hee alleadged, that man was first made of the earth and of vwater, vvhich two Elements (as hee affirmed) were tempered and shaped vwith the heate of the funne. Then *Empedocles* conceived that all the members of man vvere made
of

of the earth, and that all the other Elements (as hee coniectured) did concur to frame and fashion the same: as the fire to giue heate, the vvater to yeelde moisture, and the aire to sende spirit vnto the rest. But omitting all vaine coniectures, & such like fabulous inventions of *Promethesus* fire, *Dencalions* stones, vvvhich the Poets fained to bee the causes, or the causers of mans Creation: let vs leuell first (in the consideration of mans Creation) vvith the more certaine groundes of Philosophy in this point, and then conclude with the vndoubted verity of the sacred history.

Some Philosophers doe define *Creation* to be a *proccesse* or a *progreession* from that which was not, to that which is: or else, from nothing, to something: when as yet there were no matter to bee presupposed out of which it might be made. This opinion, as it is contrary to that of other Philosophers, which said that, *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, that is, of nothing, nothing is made: so it draweth nearest to the truth, and agreeth best vvith the infallible authority of the holy Scripture, vvvhich saith that *the world was made of nothing*, by the word of the ever-living vvords, vvithout any other foreknowne matter saue only Gods word, his vvill, and his vvisedome: and of this nothing (made something) was man at the first created, as holy writte doth testifie: for hee was made of no other moulde then of the dust of the earth, a weake and slender beginning for a high and hauty minde, but most fir, to set forth the great might, of the almighty Creator.

1. Phys. c. 4.

Gen. 1. 1.
Eccl. 10. 9.

12.
Wisd. 11. 14

CHAP. 5.

The Consideration of thy selfe what thou art in thy Conception, and naturall Constitution.

THe next Consideration after thy Creation, is, the Consideration of thy *Conception*, and of thy naturall *Procreation*, and *Constitution of body*: wherein, if thou wilt know vvhat thou art: first consider that by the fall of thy first Parents (who were purely Created without any Corruption) their disobeying

of their Creators commaundement; caused the curse to fall on them, & on their posterity: whereby not only they, but, for their sake, the earth & all other creatures were subiect to the curse, so that of a pure Creation (by mans transgression) became an vn-pure Generation. And that thou maiest farther consider what thou art in this kind of generation (or as we call it *Conception*) learne that *generation is a beginning to be that, which it was not, but by vviuy of mutation of one forme into another.*

Now to come more neere vnto the Consideratiō of thy selfe what thou art in this thy Generatiō or Procreatiō; if one should aske thee, how thou wast conceived? and how thou camest into the world? thou wilt (it may be) answere, even as other men did, & do: I was begotten of my father, & borne of my mother. Yea but how is that? not to rip vp the secrets of nature (for that wold rather fauour of immodesty, then farther thee in the due Consideration of thy selfe what thou art:) thou maist know that thou hadst but a meane beginning of Conception (be thy birth never so great) and know thou, that thou haddest no other meanes of Procreation, then the meanest man living, for thou wast (what-soeuer thou art) conceived without honour, delivered with vvy, & that with the great danger of her, that brought thee into the world: so that, though we omit the manner of thy first fourming in thy mothers womb (whereof thou oughtest to take no pride) yet *Plinie* the most excellent naturall Philosopher, and most exquisite Secretary of natures workes, will tell thee; that beasts are not bound in chaines, when they are borne, but thou man art most unhappily borne with thy hands and thy feete bound, beginning the world with punishment: *O madnesse of man* (saith he) *thinking that of these beginnings he is borne to be proud, when at the first hope of strength, and the first gift of time maketh him like to a four-footed beast: for hee is forced on his armes and legges, being not otherwise able to stande or goe:* This saith *Plinie* of thy birth. But if thou wilt enter farther into Consideration of thy naturall Constitutiō of body after thou art borne, thou shalt finde that as thou arte borne naked, so thou dost stil of thy selfe remaine naked, having by nature no other covering or any defense saue only thy bare body,

*Plin. natur.
hist. lib. 7.*

body, but that thou dost borrow helps of other creatures, which thou accomptest but as base and vile: for thou cloathest & keepst thy selfe warme with garments made of wooll, being but the covering of silly sheepe: with skinnies, the naturall garments of brut beasts: thou deckest thy selfe with filke, being but the excrements of poore women: with flowres, being but the overgrowing of vilde fields: with stones, being but the of-scowring of the earth, of the sea, and of rockes: all which the needy naked man doth borrow of beasts, and of other creatures, to cover, to maintaine, & to adorne his weake and al-wanting body. But thou, not being content to vse the helpe of those naturall creatures for the supply of thy natural defects, dost yet therewith take occasion to grow proude, like the begger, vvhich having borrowed a new coate, should therewith presently fall into liking of himselfe & scorne al the rest of his fellowe beggers. So doth the naked vnconsiderat man borrow of birds, feathers: of beasts, skins, wooll, vvvith other coverings: of both birds and beasts, the flesh to feed him; he borroweth favours & ornaments of flowres; of fruits, fastenace; of those things which come out of the earth, beauty &c. And having al these helps not of himselfe, but of other creatures, he vseth them as instrumētts to increase his pride, rather then to sustaine his necessities. This might serue in the Consideratiō of thy selfe, vvvhat thou art according to thy *naturall Constitution of birth and of body*, to teach thee how vveake, and how vnprovided, how meane, and how needy thou art by nature: vvvhereby thou maiest profitably learne *humiliation*, and to abate that proude conceite, vvvhich good successe and prosperity might plant in thee.

CHAP. 6.

The Consideration of thy selfe what thou art in the fruition of this short and vncertaine life.

After thy birth & constitution of body, the Consideration of this *life's* fruit craveth place: wherein if thou wilt know, what thou art, consider first how short this life is. Thou

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ching this it is true, which one saith, that *nothing doth deceiue man so much, as that they are ignorant how shorte a space they haue to liue, and therefore doe alwaies promise vnto themselves a longer time to liue.* And as an vnseasonable yeare doth either parch the leaues of trees by reason of excessiue heate and drought, so that they wither and fall away, or by extreame colde are consumed, or by blustering stormes are blowen of: so doth any extraordinary distemperature either of heate or colde, drynes or moisture destroy, or at the least indaunger the life of man. And if thou doubte heereof, the Physitions will tell their opinions plainly, that there are foure faculties by which the life of man is maintained, and that if any of these foure faculties doe misse his force and operation, then mans life presently perisheth. The first, is the *Attractive faculty*, by which the nourishment is drawn into the partes nourished: that consisteth of heate and drines: and if any of these two doe abounde or be deficient, then presently the *Attractive* looseth his office, and the life of man is mightily indaangered.

2 The second faculty is the *Retentive*, whereby the nourishment attracted is retained vntill it be digested: this consisteth of cold and drines; and if either of these qualities be not alwaies rightly proportioned, the *Retentive faculty* faileth of his force, and then the life of man is likewise in perill.

3 The third is the *Digestive faculty*, by which the attractive and the retained nourishment is digested: this consisteth of heate and moisture, the which two qualities, if they be not well conditioned, then also the life of man cannot long continue.

4 The fourth is the *Expulsive faculty*, by which all superfluities are eiected: this consisteth of colde and moisture, which if they be not moderately mixed, then the *expulsive faculty* cannot performe his force, and so the excreaments which should be expelled, doe turne into inward corruption, whereby the life of man is soone cut of.

Lastly if any of these foure *faculties* haue not his due effect, then the stomacke (in which is the *Nutritive appetite*) doth decay: or the liueor, in which the subtile matter is separated from the

the grosse, is defectiue: or the members to be nourished, are not nourished by way of the vaines, through the which humor and moisture are conveyed: or the arteries, by which the vitall spirites are led. In all this it doth appeare how shorte the life of man is, and how soone it is cut of by sicknesse, besides many other (almost innumerable) meanes, which are instrumentes to shorten his life. If then there be so many meanes to indamage and indaunger mans life, and so fewe to preserue it, howe can there be any reckoning made of the length of it? but that with the Princely Prophet and Propheticall Prince King David it may be deemed to be but as a spanne lög; or, like to a tale which is told, and suddainly ended; to a bubble vpon the water soone broken; to a miste, which quickly vanissheth; to a shippe, which saileth so speedely, thaa it cannot be seene which way it wente; and to an arrow, or a birde flying in the aire. Many such sharpe similitudes haue beene set downe by them, that haue duly considered the shortnes of mans life. And surely though some liue a little longer then other, and most men doe hope or at least desire to liue long: yet every man doth see that hee which liueth longest, doth but borrow (as it were) a small time of his fellowes, and in that little time, that he liueth longer then others, he still hasteneth vnto his end: for as a man, which is in a shippe sailing on the seas, whither he sitte, stande, or walke, the shippe still goeth on her way, and he that is in her, goeth with her: so man howsoever he be busied in this worlde, whether idle or occupied, whether asleepe or awaking, time passeth away, and his life in, and with time, yea even in a moment of time is cutte of. For if the longest liuer in the world be asked how long he esteemeth the time, or how soone it is past since he was borne, hee will aunswere it seemeth vnto him but as yesterday: except it be one, whose life hath bene full of miseries, to him (perchaunce) every day will seeme a moonth, and every moonth a yeare, and the time to longe that he hath liued. David the Prophet telleth vs that *the age of man is three score yeares and ten, and if bee time anie longer, it is rather to bee reckoned a vexation, then a life: this is a short time, for a man to liue no longer, and yet if every one might at-*

Psal. 59. 6.
Psal 90. 9.

Psal. 90. 10.

taine

taine to these yeares, the life of man might be said to be of some length. But if it were possible to record the yeares of every man that dieth, we should finde in that large Register of mens lues, that where one man arrieth to the age of threescore yeaes and ten, there are a hundreth which doe not see halfe so many: there dye many moe in their infancy, then in their ripe yeares; & moe in youth, then in olde age: all which sheweth how shorte this life is, and what thou art in the Fruition thereof. Adde vnto this the Vncertainty thereof, wherein thou maiest quickly conceiue how many and sundry sortes of casualties thy life is subiect vnto, which makes that more vncertaine then the winde, that is, ever mutable and full of alteration. To confirme this, if wee should goe about to reckon how many instruments death hath to bring every mans life to an vnexpected end, the best memory would rather faile to reckon vp the several engines that death vseth to destroy mans life withall, then that death would want meanes to worke a sodaine and an vncertaine end of mans life.

*Aul Ge Lib.
15. Cap. 20.*

This may be prooved by diuerse examples of men of all degrees, sortes, and conditions, whoe in their best strength and chiefest time of their health and prosperity haue bene suddainly set vpon by the vncertaine executioners of death, when they least suspected them or thought thereof. As for example; The famous greeke Poet *Euripides* (being in good health) supped with *Archelaus*; after the which, as he returned home, when he thought himselfe least in daunger of death, he was sodainly, and that on a trice, torne to pieces with dogges and so founde by triall, how vncertaine this life is.

*Plutarch, in
vita C. Cesa.
Bruti.*

Cesar (who had past infinite perilles in the wafres) was (by *Brutus* and *Cassius*) slaine suddainly in the Senate house, where he thought his life to be most safe, and least suspected the daunger of death: so approving (by his vntimely end) the vncertainty of every mans life. *Q. Curtius* writing the history of *Alexander the great*, reporteth that whē he had conquered the world and death to, as it seemed to himselfe, he was, comming to *Babylon*, caught suddainly by death, and made to know and confesse that vncertaine is the life of man: though he were so great

a monarch. *T. Hostilius*, the third King of *Rome*, vvhen he sup-
posed himselfe safest and freest from deatnes darte, vvvas stric-
ken on the suddaine with a thunder bolte, and his house burn-
t to ashes with the lightening. *Tarquinius Priscus* also the 5. King
of *Rome* was, sitting at dinner, (vvhen he least dreamed of death)
choaked with the boane of a fish, and died thereof that night: all
which may well witnesse how shorte, and howe vncertaine the
life of mā is. The Poets haue preatily fained that there are three
sisters, whome *Seneca* called the *Destinies*, and *Cicero* supposed to
be the daughters of *Heretius* and *Nox*, whome they affirme to be
very much busied about the life of man: their names are *Clotho*,
Lachesis, and *Atropos*: the first doth weaue the threede of life,
the second doth lengthen it a little, and the last doth cleane cut
it of: but the last of the three hath the quickest hande in her
woorkes; for vvhat the other two doe frame for a time, that
she doth vndoe in the moment of time: and the threede of life,
though it should bee somewhat longe in spinning, yet it is cut
of in the twinc kling of an eie, and vvhen vve thinke it is stron-
gest, then cometh *Atropos* vnawares to perfourme and playe
her parte, Death hath also three principall seruauntes, vvch
he employeth much, and often about this busines, and they as
diligently put in execution and perfourme what he commaun-
deth for the shortening and soone cutting of, of the life of man,
vvwhose names (as casualty, infirmiry, and olde age) gaue suf-
ficient prooffe and testimony that shorte oftentimes, and most
vncertaine is the life of man, & what account we should make
of it, and what man is in the fruition thereof,

Plutarch
in vita Numa.

4
Cic. Lib. de
natura deor.
Clotho collu-
gestas, Lache-
sis trahit,
Atropos
occidit. a

CHAP. 7.

*The Consideration vvhat thou art in the fru-
tion of so painfull a life.*

THis Consideratiō concerning mans life, is of the grieuous
paines & miserable torments, which very often and most
commonly do accompany thy selfe: as, *Sickness in thy body,*
C Sa-

Sorowes and passions of the minds, the Vekindnesse of friends, the Envy of enemies, the Deceits of flatterers, and other worldly Mishappes, vvhich breede such multitudes of miseries, as are almost vnpossible to bee named, and very harde and painfull with patience to be endured.

And first for the grievous paines that Sicknesse breedeth and bringeth vnto the body, we see, and daily experience telleth vs, that many men are so tormented therewith, that their whole life from the cradle to the graue is but the drawing of an ever-fainting breath, and (as it were) a lingring death, or rather a painfull life, more grievous then death it selfe. As the fish *Clupea* (which when the moone increaseth, is white, and when it doth decrease, becommeth blacke, growvng to any greatnesse, killeth himselfe for the paines of those prickles, that come out of his owne sides; so men possessed and payed with sicknes doe chaunge both colour and complexion as *Clupea* doth, or as the moone waxeth and waneth: and vvhhen they growv to any yeares, the prickles of their paines is the cause of their death. If vve shoulde seeke for example to shewe how that many men have beene mightily tormented with sicknesse, vve might easily find & see an endles sea of instaunces to confirme this conclusion, wherein we vvill not wade much to wearie the Reader, but rather referre him to consider of the cruell experiment that poore miserable men doe make thereof, who pining with continuall sicknesse languish all their liues long from their mothers breastes till they bee borne offoure, and brought to their last and longe homes onely, and for a taste herein, I will set before him a fevve (of many) such examples as the holy scriptures offer vnto vs. *Mephibosheth* the sonne of *Jonathan*, the sonne of *Saule*, was lame of both his legges, and ledde a lingring languishing life all his daies. *Israh* daughter vvasted vvith sicknesse, and the vvoman of *Canaan*s daughter vexed vvith a Devill, had ended their daies vvith dolour and grieve, if *CHRIST*, at the humble suite and petition of their parentes, had not shewed mercy vnto both. *Marke* maketh mention of a miserable vvoman, vvwhose body vvith sick-

2. Sam 4.4.
Math. 9.

Mar. 5.

sickenesse was wonderfully weakened, and whose wealth
with Physicians was wasted, her issue of blood continually
increasing, so that in twelue yeares she never had ease one day.
What what shall I speake of that woman, whome her infirmities
had bowed together? and of whome *Christ* saide, that Satan
had bounde her for eightene yeares. The poore man that laye
at the poole of *Bethesda* kept his bedde eight and thirty yeares
not able to helpe himselfe till *Christ* healed him. The same
was the state of *Agbarus* King of *Edessa*, of vvhome *Eusebius*
maketh mention: it vereto longe, and an infinite labour
for me to lay downe all that might be remembered to this pur-
pose: let him that would knowe more, aske the Physitian how
many sundry sortes of diseases he seemeth to knowe, though
he seldome cureth most of them, all which are ordained for the
punishment of sinners, and are inflicted vpon miserable men in
all ages. Onely I will ende with poore and patient *Iob* whose
life during his triall was much more grievous then death, whose
children were destroyed suddainly, whose goods were taken
from him violently, whose body was diseased straungly, whose
wife vpbraided him wickedly, whose friends rebuked him sharp-
ly, what greater Crosse could be laid on man? bereaft of childre,
spoiled of goods, abused by his wife, condemned by his friends,
sore in body, sicke in mind, what misery may be compared here
with? was it any marvaile that he desired his death, or rather that
he had never bene borne?

Luc. 13.

Ioh. 5. 1.

Euseb. Lib.
1. Cap. 14.

Iob. 1.

chap. 2.

Cap. 10. 18.

Now, how painfull the life of man is, which is subiect vnto
so much sorow, we may perceiue it by the visage, and see it in
the estate of their bodies who are overwhelmed therewith. For
most commonly their bones are dried vp, and their bodies ther
by made like vnto an anatomy: whereof grewe that olde *Adage*,
vvhich adviseth a man *not to eat up his heart*, signifying
that such as are troubled vvith much sorowve, consume
away, even as if they had eaten vp their owne heartes, and
end their liues with supping vp that sowre potion. How pain-
full mans life is, that is possessed vvith sorowve, may well
bee perceiued, and that everie man hath his parte

The Consideration

thereof, is pregnant to be proued, for that is true which the Poet testifieth thereof, speaking to man thus:

*Quocumq; aspiceres, gemitum, luctumq; sonabant
Formaq; non taciti funeris intus erat.*

that is,

Which way so-e're thou looke about,

There sighes and sobbes doe sound:

It is no silent burials shape,

That in thy selfe was found.

These verses doe well declare howv that mans life is full fraught with cares & sorrowes. Care men haue to preuent perils as they are comming towardes them, and they sorrow when they see that they cannot overcome those, which are already befallen them: so that sorrow sitteth (as it were) on every side, and at every hand, before and behinde man; whereby his life is environed with perpetuall paines.

And as for the paines, or deadly tormentes rather, that by meanes of externall evils (as, the unkindnesse of friends, the enuies of enemies, and, the deceits of flatterers) doe inseparably accompany mans life, they are to too well knowne to every man both in their owne particular experience, and also in the examples of others. For the first, it is most true, and not doubted of by any, that the greatest calamity that can happen to a man, and may most grieue & molest a faithful friend, is to be vnfaithfully dealt withall by him, whom he accompted and esteemed for his best friend: this made the poore Poet thus pittifully to complaine of his friends vnfaithfulnesse,

Omnia iam sicut fieri quae posse negabam,

Et nil est de quo non sit habenda fides:

Hac ego vaticinor, quia sum deceptus ab illo

Latinum misero quem mihi rebar opem,

that is,

All things shal be, which once I deem'd could ne're be done:

And nought there is, to which my faith shal not be wonne.

This I foretell, because I was decei'd by him,

Who vnto me I thought would succour bring.

By

By this it shoulde seeme that the poore miserable banished Poet felte nothing more grievous amiddest all his miseries in his exile, then the deceipt of his reputed friende: vvhereby also this is made manifeste, that greate is the griefe, and much is the paine that falsshood in friendship procureth a man.

The painefull tormente that an *envious enemy* worketh a man is little inferiour, nay rather it equalleth the former. For this adversary, Tet on rage, and inflamed vvith ire, is resolued (as an *T. Livius.* vnextinguishable fire) to consume the life, the honour and the whole estate of him that is envied: and vvho is hee that is truly vertuous vvhich is not subiect to envies iavves? And as *Pal. Max.* *Lib 4. Tis.* *de amicis.* *Xen. in* *Pad. Cyri. 4* *Xenophon* saith, *hee is in verie evill case whome no man envieth*: neither could hee in his daies remember any vertuous man that was not cruelly stunge vvith this poysoned and most venomous serpent: vvhereby wee may vvell note hovve that mans life is much tormented with envie.

Lastly, of the *deceits of flatterers*, how farre forth it tormenteth mans minde, this at the first is not seene of molt men, but lyeth hidde as a padde in the stravve. For the flatterer covereth his knavery vvith the cloake of good counsell; and shaddovveth his subtil devise by soothing and smoothing of him, vvhome hee is aboute to deceiue, euermore praying and commending his actions; howe euill soeuer; and dispraising the vvorkes and deedes of others, hovve good soeuer; as hee findeth his humor, and may best feede the fantasie of him that he followeth, vntill hee haue vvonne him to vvork his owne woe, and in the end brought him to the deepe dungeon of vtter destruction: then (but commonly to late) men repent them that ever they knewe such companions: and are vveary of them, when they perceiue howe that they haue brought them sorrowe, shame, and confusion, to vexe, grieve and torment their mindes continually and as long as they haue daies to liue: neither is this the least adversary, though last set downe here, that troubleth and disquieteth the life of man.

By these and such other meanes, more then can vvell be manifested, to mans life (fraught with anguish and paine) is made so loathsome vnto himselfe, that vvhich he vvhich with *Ethas* doth not wish to die, & confesse that he is not better then his fathers: whose bodies be at rest, as he vvhould be? and saith not vvvith Paule: *Cupio dissolui, & esse cum Christo*, I desire to be dissolved and to be vvith Christ? For that vvere to a Christian heart advantage in deed. By the rules of Christianity vvee should learne truely to be contented vvith all crosses and calamities vvwhich happen vn. to vs in the course of this life; yet our natural corruption is such, as it vvill not suffer vs to indure troubles vvith patience. This, that hath beene said, may in some sort suffice to shew (though not fully and perfectly) howv painful, howv tormenting, and howv ful of cares the course of this life is: & serveth fitly to stirre and mooue thee to consider and vveigh vvell vvith thy selfe vvhat thou art in enioying of so short, so vncertaine, & so painefull a life, as this is.

CHAP. 8.

*The Consideration what thou arte in thy death,
and manner of dying.*

THe last Consideration of this first part, is; concerning thy death: vve meane not here to discourse, but cursorilie, of the difference betweene *corporall* and *spirituall*, *temporall* and *eternall* death, best beleeeming the pens and paines of great and graue Divines, but only to speake of the death of the body most familiar and best knowne to all men. It is an old saying & very true, that *as sure as man is borne, so sure he is to die*. Some said that death is three. folde, but rather might have said, and that more soundly, and more truely, that it hath three degrees: the first *Naturall*, the second *Criminall*, the thirde *Iudicall*. For the first, vvwhich is *Naturall* or the dissolution of nature, this (as is said before) as it is common to all men, and no man is exempted from it, so it hath in it many things seeming very fearefull, and procu-

procuring much amazement, vvhich yet ought not to bee feared at all: as vvhen death dravveth neere (lending before him his harbinger *Sickness*) he presenteth vnto the sick man a gaffull countenance, and leane bones vvithout flesh: yea hee doth offer to his remembrance the losse of all his goods and honors, his departure from his friendes, the sequestering of his soule from his body, and the seperating of himselfe from the vvorld & from all things in the vvorld, how deare and delightfull soeuer vnto him: vvhereby the senses are all over-loaden and burthened vvith sorrow; according to the saying of the Poet:

Mille modis laetis miseris mori una fatigat.

that is,

A thousand kindes of deathes and moe,

Death hath at hand, to vvorke mans vvoe.

All vvhich, behelde of the meere naturall man in the grimme visage of death (as it vv ere in a looking glasse) seeme very dread full; but of these chiefly, the loue of this life maketh him most of all to feare death, and yet to him that is truly vvise the sadde sight of death yeeldeth no such hideous aspect or discontentment, but rather mooueth him to remember and make good vse of that excellent saying of *Seneca*: *Before olde age I had care to liue* *Sen. ap. 1. 62* *vvell, that I might in olde age die well,* that is vvillingly. For to die vvillingly, is to die vvell: vvhich if a man vvould consider and put in practise, then needed he not to feare this naturall death of the body. Full vvell said the Heathen Philosopher, that vv. *Cice. in som* *Scip.* lesse God should free man from the keepers (or from that prison) of the body, there could be no passage into heauē. Though death doe dissolue this temporall and momentary life frō the body; yet if a good death follow a good life, it addeth a longer life vnto this temporall and transitory life, and it taketh away all cares and calamities from the body and life of man, in so much that such a death may aptly be called the end of labours, the conservation of victory, the gates of life, and the entraunce into euerlasting felicity. Thus may the vertuous, discrete, and considerate man learne to know what he is concerning the first degree of death, vvhich we cal *naturall*, or the dissolution of nature.

As

As touching the second degree of death, vvhich vvee call *Crinimall*, or the death of offence, this vnto many men seemeth no, thing fearfull, although it ought more to bee feared then the first. The first degree of *Naturall* death every man must yeelde vnto, and paye vndoubtedly as a due debte to Nature, or rather to the Creator of Natures vvorkes: but the seconde degree of death, vvhich is the death of *offence*, as it begonne and brought in that first death vvhich vvee tearme *Naturall*; so is it, or it ought to be much more feared then the same. For one of the Fathers saith, that *Adam and Eue* beganne to dye in the same day that they did receiue the lawre of death; that is vvhether they offended first, and that by one mans offence, death came vnto all men. This death of offence vvhich is cause first of the *Naturall*, then of the *Iudiciall* death, ought therefore most of all to be feared, yet wee see, and that to to commonly, howe men make small reckoning of this death and doe least dreade it, else vvoulde they not be so proane and ready to runne on head-long, and to committe those offences, that doe procure death, and perpetuall destruction. This *death of offences*, or the offence it selfe, vvhich causeth death, ought to be very much feared. For though men, while they liue, doe lightly and little regard it, yet it bringeth with it to torment them (vvhether they are a dying) shame horror and confusion.

Aug. sup.
Gen.

3 The last degree of death, or the last effect of it, is the death
of *Iudgment*: this hath three stepps or staires by which it mount-
eth either to eternal happines, or else descendeth vnto endlesse
paines and torments. For Iudgment is saide to be of three sortess:
the first is of *our selues*; the seconde is of *men*; and the third is of,
or, by the *Creator of man*. For the first Iudgment of *our selues*
concerning our deathes and of our desertes of death, this is
inward and contained in the Conscience of everie man,
vvhich Conscience vvhether it giueth iudgment against a man,
it makes him feeble the paines of death in life, and it figu-
reth vnto him the perpetuall paines vvhich he shall endure
after death.

An heathen Philosopher could say that a *guilty conscience is like to an ulcer in the body*. For it leaueth sorrowe and griefe wounding him and scattering in his heart and minde continually. When reason can relieue the minde moued otherwise to sadnesse, nothing can ease the galling and torture of a guilty Conscience; which caused the comfortlesse Poet to confesse and say:

*Plus de
animi tran-
quillitate.*

*Pamtes, o si quid miserorum creditur ulli,
Pamtes, et sulco torquear ipse meo.*
that is,

*Ouid lib 1,
de Ponto
Eleg 1.*

I doe repent, if any wretched wight,
Might credit haue, or be beleud in this:
It grieveth me, and galleth day and night
My woefull heart, that I haue done amisse.
This is the fruite, and onely ease I finde,
A guilty deede, yealde to a galled minde.

Therefore this Iudgment of our selues in our owne consciences, that we haue not onely deserued this temporall but an eternall death, is (without it be eased by perfect Penitence) a double death vnto vs.

The second stepp of Iudgment, is the Iudgement of *men*: whereon death also doth depend. As the iudgmēt of our selues is *internall*, and in our owne consciences: so the iudgment of men is *externall*, depending vpon exteriour proofes & probabilities, whereby they giue their iudgment of life and death. And although that the Iudgment of men, be not alwaies true in their definitiue sentence, and decree of men, howe they haue deserued either to liue or dye; because that they which are the Iudges, whither with authority or without, may mistake the lawes by the which they iudge: or else those; that produce proofes vnto them, may either wilfully or ignorantly misinforme and misguide them: yet it behoueth every wise man discreetly to submitte himselfe vnto that sentence of the Law, which limitreth vnto him either life or death. For as the excellent Orator affirmed, *it is not lawfull to maligne magistrates though they be wicked & euill*: the reason thereof is, because that they, vwhen they do giue iudgment of life and death, are the substitutes of him,

*Demosthe
Can And*

D

who

vvho is the author of life and death. And, if thou vvilt dye vvell, avoide and eschevve all evill decdes, vvhich are the occasions of this iudgement of men, vvhich deeme and iudge thee worthy of death. For this iudgment of death doth commonly follow the evill actions of a badde life.

- 3 The last steppe, in the last degree of death, vvhich is called *the finall Iudgment*, followeth death, at the latter daie, vvhen the vniverfall iudgment of mankind shall bee, and either eternall life or eternall death insuet h. Of this I purpose to speake but as an occurrent by the vvay. Then shall bee the beginning of glory to the good, and to the vvicked of shame and confusion: then shall bee the seperation of the sheepe from the goates, of the corne from the cockle, and of the blessed from the accursed. After this, then they, that receive the sentence of life, shall never dye or feare death any more: and those, vvhich are appointed to dye, can never hope for life againe: whatsoever some men haue dreamed of this matter, whereof we purpose not heere to intreate. This last degree of death, or difference betweene life and death, hath in it either much *fears* or much *ioy*: feare to the wicked in respect of former offences, but ioy vnto the faithfull in their hope of enjoying future happinesse, which followeth after a vertuous life and a godly end. And as *Lactantius* alleadgeth: *if it be asked of vs, vvhyther death bee good or evill, vvee must answer, that this or that mans death is good or bad, as his life was either good or bad vvhich bee had lead before.* For if thy life be good, then vvill thy death also be good vnto thee: but if thy life be evill, then likewise is death evill vnto thee.

*Lactantius
divinus inst.
Lib. 6. cap. 4*

The Conclusion of this first parte of the first pointe of Consideration concerning thy selfe, VVhat thou arte.

BY this litle touch or light handling of Consideration, herein (gentle Reader) tendered vnto thee, (if thou hast read over the same with good regarde) thou maiest thereby make some triall concerning the knowylledge of thy selfe, what thou

arte in thy Creation, in thy Procreation and byrthe, in thy Life, and in thy Death. All which, if thou doe well and advisedly consider, thou shalt finde that to be true, which *Bernard* affirmeth, that man is sicke of a threefolde malady; in the beginning, in the middle, and in the ending; that is, in his *birth*, in his *life*, and in his *death*. For his birth is *vnpure*, his life is *perverse*, & his death *dangerous*. His birth it is *vnpure*, by reason of our first parents fall, and the daily offences of our naturall parents, which mooued the Psalmist (well weighing it) to say that *in sinne bee wee conceived*. His life is *perverse*, because that by nature he is proane to all euill actions. His death is *dangerous*, because his life is vitious. There is in our birthe, a *beginning* of sorrowe: there is in our liues, a *continuance* of the same: & there is in our deathes, either a *dissolution*, or else a *perpetuall possession* thereof.

*Bernardus,
in sensen*

Psal. 51. 5.

The end of the first Section of the first parte of Consideration,

D 3

The

THE SECOND SECTION OF

*the first part of the Consideration
of humane Condition.*

CHAP. I.

The Consideration of thy selfe, who thou art.



Ow having said somewhat concerning the first part of the first point of the Consideration of thy selfe, which is, *What thou art*: it is necessary that we proceed farther to the seconde part of this first point of Consideration; which is, *Who thou art*. The Consideration whereof doth containe in it the remembrance & reknowledgement of thy parentage, linage, and descent: the knowledge of thy state of body, of thy vvealth, calling, dignity and wisdom. To the goodnesse and greatnesse of which giftes the Philosophers in former times haue attributed a great part of mā's felicity; calling Riches, Nobility, & Honors, the goods of *fortune*; Health, Strēgh & Beauty, they tearmed the goods of the *body*; Wisdom, Learning and Vertue they esteemed to be the goods of the *Minde*.

By the true Consideration of thy selfe, *who thou art in the possession of these blessings*, thou maiest learne to know, that if thou haue any, or all of them, thou art yet no otherwise happy in them, then according as thou doest vse them: for if it be true, that there is a difference betweene *vsing* and *enjoying* of thinges, in that wee are saide properly to vse onely those thinges that are temporall; and to *enote* those thinges that are eternall: thou maiest consider that thy parentage, thy health, thy dignities, & thy wisdom being things tēporal & transitory, are then only to be vied of thee here for a time, & that but for very short time; for thou maiest by no means enjoy the alwaies. This, wel pōdered & thought vpon, will loone bring thee to the knowledge
of

*Per. Lamb.
lib. 1.*

of thy selfe, *Who thou art*. For there is nothing that letteth and hindereth a man more from the knowledge of himselfe, then the opinion and sonde conceipte he hath of the goodnes, greatnes, and durabienesse of those worldly blessings, which he doth possesse, and so entirely affect. Therefore to vveede out the over-weening opinion thereof, vvee vwill first beginne with thy linage and parentage, and so bring thee by litle and litle into the consideration of thy selfe, *vbo thou art*. Art thou descended of a noble family, or of a base linage? if thou be noble borne, then commonly *pride* and *presumption* catch holde and lay such violent handes on thy vwill, thy affection, and thy vnderstanding, that they can hardlie bee remooued from thee, till they haue remooued thee from the knowledge of thy selfe, *vbo thou art*. For thy presumptuous pride and selfeliking affection will make thee beleue that thou art much better, then indeed thou art. This makes men many times to measure their owne greatnes of birth as they doe their shadowes, vvvhich alwaies seeme bigger then their bodies, and by degree it draweth them to beleue that their birth and parentages are farre better then the birthes and parentages of any others are, or may be.

As, *Alexander* the great, after he had obtained many & notable victories, could not then be cōtented to be called any longer the sonne of *Philip* King of *Macedon*, but vwould needs bee accompred the sonne of *Iupiter Hammon*, and so be deemed to haue beene descended from the Gods. *Saber* King of *Perfi* called himselfe *King of Kings*, partaker of the planets, and, brother to the *Sunne* and *Moon*. *Hanno* the *Carthaginian* caused birdes to bee taken, and taught to say, *Hanno is a God*: which birdes were afterwarde cast abroad in diuerse places, that they might publish this his feined Deitie vnto the people.

Even so commonly wee see that many of noble birthe and greate parentage perswade themselves that they exceede all others in estimation of bloode and linage: vvhereas they mighte consider vvith themselves that howe noblye soeuer

they are borne, their Nobility hath a beginning, not by their own, but by their Auncestors deserts & vertues, wherfore if that there be not in them good partes and properties aunswereable to the behaviour and good qualities of their Elders, and their owne birthes, then are they but a blemish to their Elders, and a staine to their names, and honors. VVe see the fairest and richest filkes, when once they receiue any blemish or staine, they are more disfigured and in greater disgrace then cloath, or other matter of lesse moment and reckoning: even so is it in the estimation of Nobility. For a fault in a man of great birth and parentage is more noted, and breedeth vnto him greater disgrace and dishonour, then the same should do vnto a man of lesse and lower dignity. It is not enough to be borne of high bloude, without vertue aunswereable to that birth: neither with reason may a noble man, because he is honourably descended, challenge loue, estimation, and honour of the actions accomplished by his Auncestors, vnlesse his owne carriage be correspondent & aunswereable to theirs, and to his owne calling: for *Seneca* sayeth, & that very truely, that, *hee which braggeth of his kindred, commendeth that which concerneth others*. And the Poet speaking to the same purpose saide very well.

*Sen. in
Herc. fur.*

*Ouid lib.
13. Meta.*

*Nam genus, et proaves, et quæ non fecimus ipsi,
Vix ea nostra voco.*

that is,

What kindred did, or Elders ours,
And what we haue not donne,
I call not ours: it scarcely hath
Vs any credit wonne.

*S. Philip
Sidney.*

This caused a Gentle man of great worth and worthines, as any that hath liued in our age, to adde this mote vnderneath his coat of armes: *Vix ea nostra voco*. VVho although hee might most deseruedly haue claimed vnto himselfe as much honor as ever any of his Auncestors haue had, yet he would not appropriate their vertues (which could not be called his) vnto himselfe: for he had rather gaine glory by his owne noble and worthy actes, then be accounted renowned for the greatnes of his

his Auncestors, how neere and how deere soever vnto him. As his noble minde is worthy of memory in all ages, and his heroi-call actes never to be committed to oblivion: so are they (which degenerate from their Elders, or doe disgrace and dishonor the honourable actions of their Auncestors) to be accounted worthy (if not of all shame) yet of a place in *Lethe* lake to lye in perpetually. *Q. Pompeius* Pretor of *Rome* did most stoutely and wisely carry him selfe, when he did interdict and dishinherit the sonne of *Q. Fabius Max.* from the vse and benefite of all his fathers goods, because he did degenerate from the vertues of his noble father, and spent that most luxuriously, which his father had most honorably gotten. There was a law amongst the *Rhodians*, that what sonne soever followed not the foot-steps of their fathers vertues should be dishherited: which lawe if it were kept, & did continue in force amongst vs this day, it would make many a sonne goe without goods, and leaue his fathers liuing for others to inherite. For our daies make experience of that, which the Poet spake, and applied to former ages.

*Aequas rara patrem soboles, sed plurimi ab illis
Degenerant, pauci superant probitate parentem.*

*Homerv.
Odyss. 1*

that is,

Fewe sonnes are found of fathers mindes,
Or equall them in vertues actes:
The greatest sorte growe out of kinde;
Who doth regard his fathers factes?

Children seldome seeke indeede,

Their fires (in goodnesse) to excede.

Now againe on the other side, if thy birth and parentage bee meane, then most commonly art thou drawn to despaire of ha-ving any great aduancemēt, although thou doe deserue it well: for Envy alwaies followeth Vertue, and that most of all, when it is placed in one of meane Parentage. For vsually those, that hold themselves better in birth, will contemne and envy their inferiours in bloud, although they bee farre theyr superiours in vertue and desearre. But this shoulde not dismaye him that deserveth well, to expect the rewarde of his desertes, how meane so-

ever.

Psal. 78.

ever his birth be. For we finde it in experience true, and the examples are infinite, how men, whose parentes were meane and poore, haue (for good partes in them) bene preferred to very high and great dignity. As *David*, a shepheard, yet afterwards annoynted King of Israel. *Tamberlane* the son of a poore shepheard in *Scythia*, and, as some say, a shepheard himselfe, by his valoure and prowesse became King of *Persia*, and was a very mighty Monarch. The father of *Sforce* Duke of *Milaine* was a poore man, who liued by husbandrie in *Casinola*, a small towne or village situate neere vnto *Ravenna*: and yet his sonne for his worth and worthynes so highly aduanced to so great a dignity. Many examples might be brought to the same purpose, of such as in former times, yea and in this latter & more vngratefull age of the world haue gotten by their vertues great preferments & high aduancements, though their births haue bene but very base: of whome we omitte further to speake, because we purpose not to disgrace or offend any, but rather to commend vertue, and to wish the aduancement thereof in al. Yet by the way of advice we could wish such as be of meane parentage, & so preferred to high places, to beware of al swelling conceipte of pride, which to to often hath infected many.

And so if the noble borne haue care of his carriage, & avoide presumption in the estimation of his honourable descent: & the meane man shun dispaire or doubt of obtaining aduancement by reason of his birth, and to losy a conceipt in his prosperous estate, then shall either of them consider well and wisely who, and what he is in his descent, and by his parentage.

CHAP. 2.

*The Consideration of thy selfe, vbo thou arte
in the state of thy body.*

THE next Consideration is of thy selfe *vbo thou arte in the state of thy body*: wherein consisteth the estimation of thy health, of thy strength and of thy beauty: in considering

sidering whereof thou shalt finde who thou arte in possessing health or sicknesse, strength or weaknes, beauty or deformity, wherein if Nature hath bestowed on thee her giftes liberally and friendlie, shee giveth thee no better gifte then the Poets faine that *Paris* gave to *Venus*, or the rewuarde that hee received of her againe. For vvhen shee stroue with *Juno* and *Pallas* for the golden ball, vvhich was to be given to her whom *Paris* deemed fairest of the three: *Paris* bestowed the ball on *Venus*, and vvith al continuall contention with the other twaine: and she rewarded him againe with *Helen* which was his vtter confusion. This fable was not devised without very good signification and a certaine morall or meaning, vvhat molestations many times followe the friendly course of Nature in them, that are healthy, strong, and beautifull in body. For if thou hast thy health, then thou art commonly carelesse of thy diet, and so fallest oft to surfetie, or else to vse some such exercise, as may indaunger thy health. For hee that doubteth not of his health, dare eate of manie dishes, and (as *Seneca* saith) *eating of many meates brings many diseases*: and in an other place, *vvasasover* (saith he) *birdes doe stie, or fishes swimme, or beastes doe runne, they are buried in our bellies*. If thou aske (saith he) *vwhy vvee dye so suddainely?* it is because vvee liue by the death of so many creatures: and they that haue most strength, are most boldest to deuoure most creatures, whereby most commonly they abate their health, and consume that vvhich they woulde fainest pamper and feede, even their bodies. The exercises also, vvhich strong bodyed men are most giuen vnto, doe withdraw many times to to many of such, from the better exercises of the minde. For seldome is it seene, that men of much might are much giuen to the study of liberal sciēces, or the meditation of diuine things: vvhich moued *Xenocrates* to exhort men that they should not exercise the body much without the minde, nor the minde altogether without the body; for the first best becometh wasters and such rude people; the second belongeth vnto Idle persons: the first breedeth strōg & sturdy ignorance; the secōd begetteth

Sen. ad Luc.
Ep. 99
Jdem, Rhet.
10.

Sen. ep. 81.

studious dulnesse: but they that are apt and fit for best things, are indifferently exercised in both body and minde. For those men, that haue stronge bodies, for the most part haue weake mindes, because they so much exercise the strength of their bodyes, that they seldome or never regarde the study of the minde: howe vveake, sayeth *Seneca*, are they in minde, vvhose strength of body vvee doe much marvaile at? so that naturall strength draweth on vnnaturall effectes, and defectes of thinges most to bee desired to bee in men. If thou haue also beauty and comelinesse of body, this blessing effectes maketh thee in the enioying thereof many times miserable and infortunate. For it maketh provvde such as enioy it, and provoketh others to vnlawfull lustes and vvicked desires, coveting the accomplishment of their fleshly appetites, and sensuall pleasures, through the abuse of others beauty, which is the nourisher and procurer of pride, as the Poet telleth thee, when he saith:

Ovid fast. 1.

Fastus inest pulchris, sequiturq; superbia formam.

which is,

Disdaine doth dwell in beauties bowre,
And pride with beauty hath great powre.

It is to often tryed, that they, vvhich are by nature beautiful, make their external beauty of the body to be the betraier of the inwarde beauty of the minde: vvhereby vve see what inconveniences doe followve the health, strength, and beauty of the body.

Nowv contraryvvise, if thou art either naturally subiect to sicknesse, or accidentally weake; if thou art by nature, or by casualty deformed, vvhat anguish, grieve, and tormentes of minde these defectes and blemishes doe bring vvith them, every one either feeleth and findeth in himselfe, or at the least may see and perceiue it in others. Therefore to temper those intemperate affections, which vsually abounde in such as abuse the blessings of the body: and also to avoide the inconveniences, which doe pursue the vvants of those naturall blessings of the body, thou oughtest to consider, that if the Creator of

natures vvorks hath bestowed the blessings of health, strength, and beauty vpon thee, that hee bestowed not them to that ende vpon thee, that thou shouldest grovv provide of them, or abuse thy body, or devise howve to make others enamored vvith thy beauty, and the rather for it vnlavvfully to desire thee. For thou haste received these sveete blessings to another ende: even that to the ablenesse of thy body thou shouldest ioine the vvillingnes of thy minde, to doe those comely and commendable deedes, vvwhich doe beautifie both the body and the minde, and vvwhich last longer then the soone-fading blossomes of beauty, the vveake and ever-slyding staffe of strength, and then thy health, vvwhich is more vncertaine then all the rest; for it is soone impaired and very quickly brought to vtter decaye. If then thy beauty faile, thy strength faile, and thy health consume and wear away; dismay not thy selfe, but rather bee armed vvith patience. For as long as the minde is indued vvith reason, and good resolution, no sicknesse or afflictions can bring the body to vveake, or so out of ihape, but that a minde prepared vvith patience and directed by vertue may very vvell indure. Infirmities may bee a meane to subdue, or at least to mooue vs to sustaine stoutly all dislikes and discontentmentes of such defects and effects in nature. VVhich Consideration (vvith the circumstances of the same) concerning thy health and sicknesse, thy strength and vveakenesse, thy beauty and deformity if thou beare allowance in thy minde, and make good vse thereof, thou shalt consider of thy selfe aright, and soone knowve what, and where thou art in the state of thy body.

CHAP. 3.

The Consideration of thy selfe vvhat, and vvhere thou art in the state of thy vvealth and riches.

THe Consideration of thy vvealth & riches doth containe two circumstaunces to be conceived of thee, and to be carried continually in thy remembrance. The first is of thy wealth and possessions, howe thou hast gotten them: the seconde is, how thou doest vse them. For by these two courses of getting & vsing thy wealth & goods, they are made either good or evill vnto thee. Sometimes men doe get their goods vvell, by honest and lawfull meanes, yet may they vse them evill; but they doe seldome, or almost neuer, that get their goods by evill meanes, turne their goods so gotten vnto good vies.

Now first, for the obtaining and getting of riches vvhither it be by lawful, or by vnlawfull meanes: it is to be considered that if thou hast riches, landes, or any kinde of liuelyhood, thou hast either gotten it by inheritance, by gift, or by thine owne industry. If thy goods and possessions come vnto thee by inheritance, and that thou hast sufficient by thine auncellors to mainetaine thy estate, then, the more thou hast the lesse shoulde bee thy care and toyle in travailling to augment thine aboundaunce, seeing that by inheritance thou hast sufficient to sustaine necessity, and to mainetaine thy calling: and yet this competency shoulde not breede a carelesnesse in thee to preserve that vnto thy posterity, vvhich thy predecessours carefully procured for thee. But such commonly is the condition of mans nature, that hee alwayes doeth desire an alteration of his estate, vvhich maketh him, that hath greate possessions left him by his parentes (not knowing or considering vvhich paines they vsed in the obtaining of it) to bee carelesse howe hee consumeth it: hee having no experience howe hardly it vvas had at the first, foreseeth not howe vneasily it is recovered vvhich it is gone, or vvhich the lacke and losse of it is, vvhich it is mispent. VVe see many times that a prodigall sonne succedeth a miserable father: vvhich, vvhich hee cometh to plenty (not by his owne, but by his parentes industrie) neuer ceaseth to seeke meane, to spende that vvhich others haue gotten for him, being drawne by delighte to lavish in expences, vvhich a vaine opinion of get-

getting fame, and procuring friendes, or other prefermentes by his liberalitie, as hee thinketh; but more truelie by his prodigality, as others doe thinke, and as himselfe shall finde vwhen all is gone, and vwhen it is to late to grovve thriftie. The reason of this is, that thinges vvhich are hardly had, are sought vvith greatest desire, and kepte vvith greatest care: and on the contrary side, vve commonly see that when vvealth or almost any other vvorldly benefite is bestowed on men freely, or that they obtaine it vvithout any great labour or difficultie, they then least esteeme it, and are soonest vvonne to departe from it. Therefore to shunne both these extremities of prodigality, and misery, in administring and bestowing of thy goods and possessions, vvvhich come to thee by inheritance, vse this mediocrity, that plenty make thee not prodigall, nor poverty causeth thee to be miserable: the meane in this, as in other thinges (though it be harde to attaine vnto) is the safest and the profitabest course, when it may be compassed and well kept: as the Poet saith.

*Est modus in rebus, sunt certi deniq, fines,
Quos ultra citrag, nequit consistere rectum.*

which is,

There is a golden meane in things,
And certaine boundes are pight.
Beyond, beside, or short of which
Cannot consist the Right.

*Horat. lib. 1.
serm. 1.*

Then if a man grovv to wealth, or great living by other mens gifts, such as were not his parents, or from whom he coulde not expect the same as an hereditary right, which happeneth diverse times vnlooked for to many: wealth so obtained, worketh like effect as that doth, which is had by inheritance; that is, it maketh him that commeth so sodainely and vvith so small travaile to his aboundaunce, to take the lesse care in keeping of it, or in spending it vvell; for such a one commonly wil verifie the old proverbe, which saith, *light come, light go*: So did *Cain Caligula*, who consumed great treasures gathered together

by *Tiberius* the Emperour. For it is reported of him, that he spent leavē-score thousand *Sesteria* in one yeare. So did *Cleopatra* the last Queene of *Egypt*, who at a supper, which she made to *M. Antoniu*, putting an excellent pearle into tarte vineger, wherein being resolved, dranke it, being esteemed at *Centes Sesteria* which is of our money 50000.¹¹

Many such we haue in these our daies bearing the like prodigall mindes, though they haue not the like meanes and abilitie: who are as ready to spend all their wealth, whither by gifte or by inheritance, yea and that as vainely as *Hehogabalu*, by wearing of precious stones in their shoes: or as *Cesar* the sonne of Pope *Alexander* the sixt, who spent every day two hundred crownes in banquetting, maintained a multitude of parasites, whome he fed and apparelled on his owne proper cost, and kept in pay eight thousand souldiers continually: all which prodigally and vainely he spent and consumed during his fathers daies. Haue not diuerse heires, and such as haue large legacies in our daies, spent as lavishly what they had, as their parents gotte the same wickedly? to whome may well be applied what the Poet writte of *Cinna*, saying vnro him thus:

*Mars. epig.
lib. 9.*

Nam tu (dum metuis, ne quid possi fatare lingua)

Hausisti patrias luxuriosum opes.

which is

Thou hast consum'd thy fathers wealth,

To feede thy lustfull minde:

For feare least thou shouldst after death,

Lesue ought of it behinde.

Now touching the getting and spending of those possessions, which doe accrue vnto thee by thine owne paines and industry: the goods so gotten, as they are obtained by thine owne induvours, so *Desire* was the mother, *Paines* the father, and *Care* the nurse of the new-borne babe, *Wealth* which many times maketh such as brought forth and nourished so vnnaturall a childe, like vnto the viper, which with the birth of her owne younge ones, is alwaies bereaved of her owne life. Therefore in the getting and vsing of thy riches and wealth remember these rules, that the goods,

goods, which are evil gotten, doe not bring so much present profite, pleasure, and prosperity, as they doe cause future daungers, and yet the fault is not in the wealth, but in them, that haue wrongfully gotten it, or in them, that cannot vse their wealth well. For that is true, which one saith, that *by how much the more any thing is in his owne nature excellent, by so much the more is the abuse therof pernicious and daungerous*. So it is not the lawful vse, but the vnlawfull abuse of riches & wealth, that is alwaies condemned. Neither are the opinions of *Crates*, *Antisthenes*, and other Philosophers of their iudgment, good and to be followed therein, who would not haue any wealth (but gaue away their goods) thinking that they would be hinderances to their desired happines: wherein they were deceiued, seeing that riches in themselves are neither good nor evil, but become such, as they are vsed: good to the good, and badde to the evil and wicked: to the good they are good helpes to vertue and to vertuous actions: to the badde they are goades to pricke forward, and supporters to maintaine all evil and vicked actions: they make not a man the better that hath them, except they be well vsed, more then a golden bitte makes a horse the better that beareth it: and to vse them well is to enioy them: as to vse them evil, is to abuse them. The good or evil vse of them also consisteth in the estimation that we make of the same. For if we growe once into to great a liking and loue of our goods, then they steale away the heart of him, that hath them, and make him a slave to his owne substance, according to that which the Poet saith:

*Ambr. sup.
Luc. Lib. 8.*

Oforius.

*Ambr. vs
Sup.*

*Creuerunt et opes, et opum furiosa cupido,
Et cupit possideant plurima, plura petunt.*

Ouid. fast. 2.

That is,

As riches doth increase with men,
So furiously they rage:
Still craving more, the more they haue:
What may their lust assagwe?

So that they doe, as the *Tragedian* testifieth, *drinke poison in golde*: Sen. in *Thy.*
or as *Midas*, whome the Poets fained to haue desired of the Gods one petition, the which being graunted him, *bes vsisted*
that

that whatsoeuer he might touch should bee turned into golde; which he obtaining purchased nothing thereby but his owne destruction. For when he should feede, his meate (by reason of his former request) becoming so hard a mettall, might well chooke his, but never nourish him. This was set downe to signifie how much harme they procure vnto themselues which purpose nothing but the heaping of wealth without regard, how it is gotten or how it shall be spent. For it is true that *Iuvenall* saith,

*Tantiis partamalis, curâ maiore, metus;
Seruantur: misera est magni custodia census.*
that is,

Ill gotten goods, are kept with greater care and feare:

Great charge of wealth the misers hart doth break & teare. Besides the wrongfull getting of them, and the great care that he hath in keeping of them, there is as great daunger in the euill vsing of the: either in not vsing the at al, but hording the vp to the hurt of many: or else in imploying of the otherwise, the they ought to be imployed. They that haue great store of goods, and vse them not at al, keepe them cloase, either because they know not what to doe with them, or else because they cannot find in their hartes to deparr with them. For the first sort they are like vnto them that haue good horses in their stables (as *Isocrates* saith) and know not how to ride the, whereby for want of vse they become altogether vnprofitable. And as for the secôd sort, that haue no desire to vse their goods, though they know how to do it, they are not very vnlike vnto the *she-Ape* which makes so much of her young-ones, that, with continual clasping of the, she many times crusheth them to death: so these covetous creatures (that know how to vse their good, and wil not) do so claspe it, and hide it in their coassers, that with the cloase keeping thereof they doe (as it were) crush it to death, for that they burie it in the sepulcher of forgetfulnesse, and vnprofitablenesse. So then it is the estimation that we make of riches, which maketh a man either happy or vnhappy in the getting, in the hauing, and in the vsing of his goods. For vnlesse his minde be his moderator

derator therein, there is no law, but the law of Reason, that can limite his desires. *Lycorgus* made a lawe amonge the *Lacedaemonians* to take away their coyne of golde and silver, allowing them only coyne made of iron; thinking that he thereby should haue brought them to despise and contemne coyne by the basenes of that mettall; yet all this could not banish covetousnes out of the cittie. For, their mindes being basely bent, they were as well in loue and liking with the baser, as vvith the better mettalls. Take away from a man all his vvealth, yet you cannot take from him his covetousnesse. For that remaineth still in his minde. If he hath little, hee desireth much, if hee haue much, hee desireth more: so that desire is the fuell, that setteth his minde still on fire. If some men doubt vvhy GOD giueth plenty of goodes vnto the badde, who knowe: eih not howe to vse them; and taketh it from the good, that can vse them vvell; *Augustine* vvill aunsvvere them that if GOD shoulde giue his temporall blessings onely vnto the good, the evill vvoulde thinke that hee ought to be glorified onely for this and nothings else. Againe, if hee shoulde giue them vnto the evill and vvicked onelie, the vveake vvoulde bee afraide to bee converted, least that they thereby shoulde vvante. If it shoulde bee taken from the evill, then they vvoulde thinke that this onely shoulde bee their punishment. From the good hee often taketh it, that they shoulde desire better things; vvhich they haue not common with the vvicked. Now that thou maiest make a right vse of this Consideration, in waighing howe thou hast gotten, and how thou doest spende thy wealth, obserue alwaies this, that in thy reasonable care to obtaine sufficiencie, thou keepe vnto thy selfe a safe conscience not to wronge them, vvith vvhome thou doest deale: and that thou grovve not isto to much loue with thy wealth; in the dispensation thereof thou oughtest also to vse Iustice vnto thy selfe in observing these fowre circumstances, to *VVhome*, *VVhen*, *VVherefore*, and *Howe* thou bestowest thy vvealth; vvhich if thou perfourme, then hast thou wel considered, *who thou art in the state of thy wealth.*

*Plutarch.
in Vis. Ly-
curgi.*

*August. de
verb. Dom.
Serm. 12.*

CHAP. 4.

*The Consideration of thy selfe, who thou art in the state
of thy calling and Authoritie.*

Two ene-
mies vnto
an honora-
ble estate.
The firste-
nemie.

*Arist. Lib. 2.
Top. & 2 li.
Eth. ca. 7.*

1

2

Ad Heren.

3

4

T. de Orat.

FOR the Consideration of thy selfe *who thou art in thy calling and dignitie*; either thy estate is honourable & worshipful, or meane. If it be honourable, then hast thou two great adversaries to assaile thee; the one without thee; the other within thee: that without thee is *Envy*: that within thee, is *pride*. Thy externall enemy, Envy, is ever feeding and gnawing on thy felicity, so that it is impossible for thee to escape Envies iawes; and that especially, if by thy vertues thou bee advanced and brought to an higher calling. For then thou shalt be sure to be set vpon on al sides by this externall enemy. For *Envy* is (as it is defined) a grieving and a grudging at other mens prosperity and happinesse. There are certaine degrees, by which Envy doth worke against the, that are envied by reason of their high callings come vnto by their good deserts. The first is a secret murmuring, when they repine at his wel-doing, whom they hate and would faine diminish his praise and glory. The second is, when by detraction they seeke to deprive him of his good name. Of such *Cicero* saith, *that they by other mens dispraise doe hurt after their owne commendations*. The third, is when they do reioice in the aduerser fortune and fall of him, that hath beene advanced for his worth and worthinesse. The last is an evill affection and inward hatred, which they beare, grieving at the excellency of another man, and therefore seeke his confusion. *Cicero* saith, that men doe many times envy their equals, and their inferiours. For when they finde themselves left behinde, they are grieved that they are out-gone by them: and very often doe they envy their superiours, and that the more vehemently, by how much more highly they esteeme or reckon of themselves, and in their iudgment doe passe the equalitie of common right by reason of the height of their dignitie and fortunes, So we see that *too high a calling*

calling is accompanied with Envie, but chiefly, when arrogancie and haughty behaviour is ioined with it. And although that Envie, this externall enemy, is very daungerous, yet is it neuer so hurtfull vnto a high estate or calling, as is the internall aduersarie *pride*. For the forraigne foe, Envie, may be easily preuented, because he commeth commonly to bidde the battaile with his banners displaid, so that he may thereby be discerned to be an enemy, and being knowne, may the more easily bee vvithstood. But the domestical and inwarde enemy, Pride, doeth more secretlie assaile thee, and stirre vp civill warres within thine owne citty and vvithin thine owne selfe; he commeth vnawares to thee when thou knowest not of his coming: or if thou hast knowledge thereof (which is but seldome) yet hee commeth not in the appearaunce and likeness of an enemy, but as a friend. For hee maketh thee beleue that hee commeth to mainetaine thine honor, reputation, & credit: & therefore, not fearing or suspecting him, thou canst the more hardly resist him. And pride, this inwarde enemy, is so much the more perilous (as one saith) then other enemies, *because other vices haue power in our euill doings; but this doeth proceede and taketh strength and full growth of our good actions and best deeds.*

The second
enemie.

*Anglib. de
nos. & gra-
tia.*

Besides these two forenamed aduersaries, an high estate or calling hath yet another enemy no lesse dangerous then the two former, which is, the flattery and *disimulation* of Parasites: and surely there is no man aduanced to any great calling, but shall be attended with such hypocrites, which are rather *followers of his fortunes, then of himselfe*; and are alwaies ready to applaude even his vvorst actions, as honourable and vertuous: whereby they blindefold him, and in the ende drowne him in the deepe and daungerous pit of *misbeliefs*: neither will such soothing fellows giue him any encouragement to vndertake any vertuous action or laudable exercise. For they holde that no pollicy, sith they finde it best to followe him in his owne humors, vvich they take to bee the onely way to come by his loue and fauour: so that by these meanes great states, and men of high place and

A third e-
nemie.

calling are soonest corrupted in their conditions : and as, when they doe amisse, few men dare tell them their faultes; so their flatterers will be ready to make their faultes seeme no faults vn- to them : whereby such followers make them worse then of themselves they would be.

Nowv to vvithstand these strong assaults, & to saue thy selfe from such dangerous invasions of three so mighty impediments to the knowledge of thy selfe in the state of thy calling, as are *Envie*, *Pride*, and *Flattery*; vse these weapons to defend thee : against *Envie*, vse *Virtue*; against *Pride* and *Ambition*, vse *humility*; and against *Dissimulation*, vse *Discretion*, to make difference betweene faithfull and flattering followers, and this may bee a marke for any generous minde, among such as follow him. The faithfull and such as desire his honour and credit, will not spare to tell him his faultes; but the flatterer will sooth him in all his doings. This if thou carry in thy remembrance, and put in practise, then hast thou well considered *who thou art in, thy estate and calling*.

THE THIRD SECTION OF

*the first part of the Consideration
of humane Condition.*

CHAP. I.

*The Consideration of thy selfe what manner of man thou
art, first as touching thy learning.*



He thirde and last point of Consideration concerning the knowledge of thy selfe is, *what manner of man thou art*. For as the second point of Consideration (which is, *who thou art*) doth appertaine to the knowledge of of the body, with the ornamentes that doe belong to the outward estate therof: so this last point of Consideration (which is, *what manner of man thou art*) doth chiefly containe the true vnderstanding of those things, which do adorne the inwarde estate of the minde. To attaine to the true knowledge whereof, it behoueth to haue the helpes of the *intellectuall, morall, and theologicall vertues*. The intellectuall vertues are saide of *Aristotle* to be five viz. *Art, Prudence, Science, Sapience, & Intelligence*. Intelligence is defined to bee *the habite of principles*; Science is said to be *the habite of conclusions*, by which we learne to distinguish *truth* from *falsehood*. By these, together with *Art, Prudence, and Sapience* (which are also partes of the intellectuall habite, of some called the intellectuall vertue) wee learne those grounds, that doe leade vs to the more perfect rules of pacifying our inordinate passions. For it is saide that *knowledge and learning doe mollifie mens manners*. But thou oughtest chiefly to knowe what kinde of *Arte*, and what knowledge it is, that can amend the minde of man, & then to follow the same. For there are some *Artes*, that when they be learned with great labour, yet are more hurtful then profitable: &

Lib. 6. Eth.

ca 3.

lib 6 Ethic.

Eth. ca. 6.

et cap. 3.

Ouid. lib. 2.

de Pont.

there are some Artes (as they are oftentimes vsed) vnneccessary, and some altogether vnlawfull. Those that are vnneccessary be such, as yeeld no commodity or profit to the publike weale, nor yet much to the private vse of him that doth exercise the: as the vaine vse of *Logick* and *Rhetoricks*, when he that hath some insight in them, hath not yet Reason how to vse them: so that *Ouid de Ph.* he maketh himselfe like to the prattling & prating *Pye*, where- of the Poet speaketh thus:

*Pica loquax variis modulatur gutture voces
Scurriis strepit quicquid et audis, ait.*

which is,

The prattling *Pye* faines every kind of voice,

And what she heares, she speaks with chattering noise,

These Artes are not in themselves vnneccessary, although for want of the right vse of them, they may be made vnneccessary & vnprofitable. Other Artes there are, that haue more pleasure then profitable vse in them, and in their owne natures are nothing or very little necessary, as *Musicke* and the like: yet I know that the louers and practisers thereof, will frame reasons to prooue the profite and necessity of them. There are also other Artes, which are not onely vnneccessary, but are also altogether vnprofitable and vnlawfull; as the vse of that part of *Astrologie* which some call *Medicinary*, wherein they would seeme to set downe the certaine times of death, and life; of barrenesse, and plenty; of warre, and peace; of mariages, of pestilence, and the like future accidents. This Arte in it selfe, is both vnneccessary, vnprofitable, vnlawfull, and vncertaine. For, as *Cornelius Agrippa* (one that was much giuen to that study in his youth, and very excellently well seene therein) saith: *Astrologie bath nothing in it else but meere trifles, Poets fables, much and monstrous forgery and faining, wherewith they haue imagined that the heauen is replenished.* Of whome another learned man saith, that these be they, which liue themselves vp against the knowledge of all that is done, promising vnto themselves a fained knowledge, and referring the events of all things vnto the rising, falling, and course of the starres, following therein their *Mathematicall errors*. But we will leaue these, as vn-

*Conde van
scien.*

Bien de nos.

law-

lawfull and altogether vncertaine; and not worthy to bee reckoned or esteemed of as an Arte. *Aristotle* doth define an Arte to be a *habite of doing with true reason*. That therefore which hath no truth, nor true principles or certaine grounds, can be no Arte. But, to come vnto those Artes which are both profitable and necessary, we may doe well to consider first, that Artes are either liberall, or illiberall and Manuary. The liberall are saide to be the *Seauen sciences*; and they may be called liberall, because they require a liberal minde to be bestowed on them, that is free from other cares, free from passions, free from sordiditie. The other Artes, which are Manuary, although they do not so much adorne the minde of man, yet are they necessary for the vse of man, and they sustaine his necessities, keeping him from idlenes, which is the *canker of the minde*: yet omitting those Manuare Artes, as matters that doe not of themselues much beautifie the minde, wee vwill say somewhat concerning the knowledge of the other Artes, which are called the *liberall Sciences*, whereby it shall be seene what manner of men they are, that attaine to the knowledge of them, and to be perfect *Artistes*. And first, as touching the obtaining of those Sciences; it hath beene a question betweene Philosophers of former ages, *whether knowledge, vertue, and science were in vs by nature, or that it came vnto vs by studie and exercise*: wherein *Plato*s opinion was disallowed and reiected of *Aristotle* and others. For *Plato* his position was this, that the soule and minde of man was at his first creation adorned and invested with all science, vertue, and knowledge, but that by reason of the infirmities of the body, it is (as hee said) dulled & darkened with forgetfulnesse and ignoraunce: so that whatsoeuer man learneth afterwards it is but (as it were) a *calling to remembrance*, and a *renewing or restoring of that, which first he knew*. But *Aristotle*, that famous Philosopher, is an aduersarie to this opinion. For he doth not acknowledge any such absolute excellency in nature: but cōfesseth that there are in mā by nature certaine feedes and sparkles of knowledge. And vve are saide to know, and to haue science by *Definition*, and *Demonstration*. The Definition, and Demonstration we doe gather from *Particulars*. For out

Lib. 6.
Cap 4.

Whither
vertue and
knowledge
be in vs by
Nature.?

Scientia (ais.
Plato) et
reminiscen-
tia: scire est
reminisci.
Arist lib. 2.
Ethic. cap. 1.

Omnis do-
ctrina et om-

nis discipli-
na (inquis
Arist. lib. 1.
poster. ca. 1)
fit ex antece-
dente cogni-
tione: id est
omnis scien-
tia fit ex cog-
nitione prin-
cipiorum per
Demonstra-
tione.

Genes. Cap. 3

Arist. Lib. 1.
Poster. Cap. 1

Idem. lib. 1.
Poetica.

of *Individuals* we gather the Definition of the *Speciall*: and out of the *Specialls*, wee gather the definition of the *Generall*. But these Definitions and principles of demonstration are not found or settled in the first frame and foundation of Nature. For by helpe of the Phantasy, which doth stirre vp and offer vnto the minde the *Ideas* or imagination of things, the Minde doth gather the essence and qualities of things, which was not at the first perceined or planted therein. It may be conceiued that *Plato* so imagined that there should be absolute knowledge in man by nature, by reason that he reade (as some haue supposed) the first booke of *Moses*, vz. *Genesis*, whereof his workes doe fauour somewhat: and finding therein that man at the first vvas created absolutely good, according to the likenes of him that created him, he was moued to imagine and thinke (as you haue heard) that he knew althings at the first, never remembring, or little regarding to examine further of his fall; and how Man, desiring to know good and euill (whereof he was ignorant, and therefore knew not all things;) did there by loose that light of knowledge, which was originally ingrafted in him; whereby also all his posterity were and are plunged in the sea of ignorance, as a punishment paide on them, and on vs all for our first Parents disobedience. And although that *Aristotle* seemeth to refute *Platoes* reason of mans perfect knowledge by Nature, yet he himselfe affirmeth that all *Doftrine* and all *discipline* proceedeth out of a *præexistent knowledge*. Whereby he might seeme in some sorte to consent with *Platoes* conclusion. Yet this is to be vnderstood that, that knowledge, which we haue is *præexistent*, yet not in vs, but in them, from whome vvee doe receiue it. Which is made plaine by an other plaice in the same Author, where he saith: that, that doctrine & science proceedeth from man vnto man according to the comparison which the teacher bath vnto him that is taught: this is a prooffe that it commeth not by Nature, but by instruction.

But now to to conclude this point of Consideration of knowledge and learning, vve ought to knowe that the beginning & ending of true knowledge and learning is to know our selves. Therefore by how much more thy knowledge and learning doth abound

bound, by so much more ought thy humility to exceede: least, forgetting thy selfe, thy knowledge and thy learning doe little benefite thee. Which rules if thou alwaies remember, then hast thou considered thy selfe aright *what manner of man thou art touching thy knowledge and learning.*

The consideration of thy selfe what manner of man thou art in thy wisdome.

CHAP. 2.

HAVING considered thy selfe, *What manner of man thou art concerning thy knowledge in learning*, as in Artes & sciences: it commeth next in course that thou shouldest consider what manner of man thou art in thy *wisdome* (for Wisdome is saide also to be one of the intellectuall Habites) & this by some is divided into two partes, that is; into *prudence* and *sapience*. *Prudence* (as they affirme) is the knowledge of humane affaires onely; but *Sapience* pertaineth to the knowledge of things both divine and humane: which is the cause that wee imitate divine things, and all humane inferiour matters are lead by the force thereof. Therefore if some men esteeme *Prudence* (vvhich is commonly called *Pollicy*) to bee the chiefest parte of Wisdome: yet howe shorte this *Prudence* or humane *pollicie* is of that *true wisdome*, vvhich containeth the knowledg of things divine and humane, vve may measure it in this, that by how much the heavens are higher then the earth; by so much the knowledg of heavenly things is more worthy, and more excellent then the knowledg of humane affaires & earthly things. *Prudence* also is vnperfect and vncertaine being (as a wise Philosopher affirmeth) many times drowned in things full of errors and of turbulency, and it is constrained to bee coupled with things casuall, to vse Consultation in matters doubtfull, which being done, it must vse the helpe of things vnreasonable for assistance. As touching the partes of *Prudence*, which are reackoned to bee *Reason*, *Understanding*, *Circumspection* and the

Aug lib. de Trin.
Cicer lib. 4. Insc.

Plut. lib. de morali ver. in sc.

the like, as they are good helpe to furnish and set forth the praise of Prudence; so are they but seldome seene to ioine & concurte altogether in one: or if any one doeth attaine to that excellency of Prudence, so as he doe possesse 'al the parts thereof, yet doth it serue but to set before him heapes of cares, and *Labyrinthes* of difficulties: so that the workes of Prudence and humane Pollicy may very well be compared to the *Spyder*, vvho taketh great paines, and vseth great arte (in her kinde) to vveaue her webbe, which when it is finished, doth serue to no other vse, but to catch some few little fearefull flies: as for the great flies they either goe by the weake webbe, or through it without any danger at all: and many times after all the paines taken therein, either the violence of windes, or of some other fowle weather on the suddaine doth deface and destroy that well-wrought web. So falleth it out ful often with the workmāship of humane Pollicie. For when a man by Prudence and humane Pollicie hath fashioned some cunning, fine, or artificial web (faire to the outward appearance of the worlde) and that withall the devises, that a curious and a painefull concept can frame; yet (in a māner) it is but as if it vv ere a vvork to catch flies in the aire, or (in deede) fooles with vaine allurements vppon the land: as for the greater flies, which are as strong and cunning as the Spider her selfe, they will catch the Spider as sone, or rather, then the Spider shall intercept or intangle them. Admitte thou (oh worldly Politique man, whosoeuer thou art) that thou hast wouen thy webbe with the threede of Prudence very strongly, procuring thy selfe great patrimonies, honorable alliaunce, preferments many, and high advancements: yet perchance on the suddaine, and when thou thinkest least of it, some suddaine stormes of ill fortunes will fal vpon thee, and so tumble thee in thy well-wrought webbe of Prudence and Pollicy, that it wil be all to rent and torne in pieces: or what thou dreamest least of, the last Conquerour *Death*, he commeth, and (as an vnplacable enemy) breaketh in pieces thy whole web so prudētly wrought and so politiquely finished to thine owne content, to the greatesoy of thy friends, & to the wonder & admiration of most men.

But

But least we should be thought to sette aside all estimation, and to make no account of Prudence, or humane Policy, which in worldly matters carrieth so great a stroke amongst men, it were not amisse to examine the partes of Prudence and to estimate thereby the value thereof: and they are reckoned by some to be, Reason, Circumspection, Counsaile, and the like. Nowe Reason as it is a part of Prudence (for Reason sometimes is taken for the principal facultie of the soule & so it is the subiect of Prudence and other Intellectuall Vertues) *is the discourse of the understanding by which the universall principles of things that may be done, are applied vnto particular things which are to be done, though diverse & uncertaine.* And so Reason & Understanding are not distinguished as two diverse powers, but as two diverse *uses* of the same power. For, *to reason*, is to proceede from one understanding vnto another, yet every kinde of Reasoning is not that part of Prudence, which we speake of in this place, because, if wee take Reasoning largely in that sence, as it is a proceeding from principles vnto conclusions, as in *Syllogismes*, and in the *Arte of arguing either Rhetorically, or Logically*; this is rather to be reckoned as an *Arte of Reasoning*, then Reason it selfe. For if Reason did consist in speaking eloquently, or in disputing subtilly, then the idle Rhetoriciā, and the subtil Sophyst should be most possessed, and best indued with Reason; and consequently, shoulde enjoy chiefly that part of Prudence. *Isidorus* saith, that *Discretio* is the provident fore-seer in iudging the causes of things, & the reason of moderating mens mindes: according to which application Reason is applied or defined by him to be, *the order of doing things proceeding from their cause, as, what, in what place, and, how thou shouldest doe, speake, and understand.*

Marrob. in
Com. somn.
Scip.

The Agn.
Sec. 2.

Next vnto Reason, Circumspection claimeth a place in the effectes and operation of Prudence: which is defined to be the attention of circumstances in morall matters: and if it be an attention of circumstances, then it must consider what doth belong vnto place, person, and time: and not so much to followe the time in all things. For that were irreligious, although some Politicians prescribe that as a good rule, & very requisite to be observed

of prudent men : but to yeelde unto necessity is a rule, which both Reason and Circumspection doth teach vs, because we are not thereby constrained to forsake the boundes and law of honesty. In this, *Circumspection* comes in as an harbinger, to lodge the Circumstances of our Circumspection, and to prepare the way to *Electi- on*, as *what, when, and how*, things ought to be done : neither may there be too much Circumspection vsed (for that it often-times turneth to iealousie, or suspicion without cause) & as the *Comedian* concludeth : *be, that is most circumspect, least he be deceived, is scarce circumspect enough, when he is most circumspect*, and this prudent man, when he is most carefull, is most commonly caught. After Circumspection commeth *Counsaile*, bringing with it the *Conclusion of Prudence*. For after Counsaile there is nothing to be performed but the execution thereof, which is the end & event of things. This Counsaile is called the *inquisitive appetite of doing things* : thought vpon with Reason : and the same author saith, that it is the *subtile foreseeing of the minds in causes to be examined or governed* : to the attaining wherof *Seneca* giveth singular precepts, saying ; if thou desire to be prudent, intende and extend thy foresight to future things, and ponder what may come to passe : let those things that must needs be done of thee, be (as it were) before thee alwaies and in thy sight ; For he that is wise, saith not, *I thought this could not be* ; he doubteth not what shall happen, but expecteth and looketh for it ; he doth not suspect it, but he doth looke and provide to prevent it : seeke therefore (saith he) if thou wilt proue wise in deed, the cause of every thing, & having found the beginning, consider and bethinke with thy selfe what may be the end thereof. These preceptes that concerne Counsaile (though they are excellent) yet notwithstanding are easier to be given, then to be followed or put in practise and accomplished : this is the substance of all difficult matters and such as haue neede of Consultation ; vvherein we finde by common experience that every man can more readily, and with words more liberally advise another man what he should doe, then if the case did concerne himselfe. For anxiety and doubt of doing that, which a man may dammage himselfe by, doth diverse times so di-

*Plaut. in
Cap.*

*Cic. lib. 1.
Rhet.
Idem lib. 2.*

*Seneca. de
de virtute.*

distract his senses betweene *seare* and *foreslunking*, that his iudgment thereby is much and mightely darkened. In Counsaile therefore, whether it be for a man his owne selfe, or for his friend a *due Deliberation* of any thing in doubt is alwaies requisite. For, as *Seneca* saith, there are two things, which are contrary and aduerse to good Counsaile, that is *sestination*, or overmuch haste; and *Anger*, or choller. And the same author adviseth every man to deliberate long of that thing, which he must do & performe, though it were but once.

*Sen. in
Proverb.*

If thou wilt vnderstande, what manner of man thou art in euery and possessing of *Prudence* or *worldly Pollicie*, or whether thou be happy or unhappy in having thereof, let this be vnto thee as a certaine rule, that it is, as all other worldly blessings are vnto thee. Gold is good, if it be turned to good vses: yea it is also euil, & maketh thee euil to, if thou doe not vse it vvel. Such is the effect of *Prudence* or *humane Pollicy*; it vvorketh also according as thou doest vse it. For as *Seneca* saith, if a prudent man exceede his bounds, he sheweth himselfe to be a subtile searcher of things hidden; a finder and a followver of al faultes, euil, full of pride, crafty, an enemy to innocency, a commender of crimes, and in conclusion, accompted of by al men as of a lewd person, vngodly, and very vvicked. And this is true, that men, vvhich are by nature polittique and vvel praused, or of great experience in vvorldly matters, if they followv not a right course, apply their heartes and vvittes to that vvhich is good, keeping themselves vvithin the compasse of *honestie* and a *good Conscience*, they are of all people most pernitiuous and most dangerous to converse, or to be dealt vvithall.

*Sen. lib. de
benef.*

G. CHAP.

*The Consideration of thy selfe, what manner of man thou art
touching the perturbations of the minde.*

THe *Minde* of man may bee compared vnto a *compasse* or a *carde*, by which the sea-men do direct their course. Which if it be truly drawne, & the points therof perfectly obserued; then the passengers most commonly do come safe & quietly vnto the hauen & harbor, wherethey would be, but if the Pilote do not place his compasse a right, & perfectly obserue the points thereof, then vsually the ship, wherein he saileth, is driuen out of the right course, and happily runneth against the rockes. Such is mans estate in this miserable world, which is *the sea*, wherein hee saileth: his *minde* is his *compasse*, & if that be not vprightly placed & directed by the points of reason, then the *compasse* serueth to no vse, but he is caried a wrong way with the violent stormes of *passions* & *perturbations* of the minde against the rocks of miseries & many misfortunes in this world. Seeing the that a quiet, a settled, & a contented minde is the only meane & compasse to carry vs fro the crosses & calamities of this worlde, & to convey vs vnto the harbor & hauen of happiness: seeing also that the Perturbations of the Minde do much hinder the true course of tranquillity & of felicity in this life: It were not amisse to examine the entrees & passages by which these Perturbations do overwhelm the minde of man, which being found out, it wil be the more easie to auoid the inconueniencies and dangerous effects thereof.

Diuers and very doubtfull haue bin the opinions of auncient Philosophers concerning the Perturbations of the minde, as what they should be, & fro whence they should proceede? whether they were only actiue or passiue qualities, or else mixed of both? what the number of them should be? Whether all kindes of perturbations were to be reiecte? with diuers other such doubtres, wherein they did much differ. And because it doth very much concerne the knowledge of mans selfe *what manner of man he is, to be informed touching the perturbations of the minde*, we will say somewhat therein.

Zeno,

Zeno, being the principall of otthe *Stoicke* Philosophers doth define. *Perturbation* (as *Cicero* alleadgeth) to be an *averſation* of the minde contrary to Reason. This definition ſome others haue ſeemed to diſlike. For they ſay that every kind of *Perturbation* is not altogether averſe and contrary vnto Reason, although moſt kinds of *Perturbations* be voide of Reason, Which *Ariſtotele* affirmeth, when he ſaith that *A vertue is converſant about pleaſure and griefe*. Alſo *Epicurus* alleadgeth that the chiefe felicity of man conſiſteth in pleaſure, wherein he is miſconceiued of many; for he placeth this pleaſure wholly in vertue and virtuous actions, and not in the pleaſures of the body, as divers do vntreuely vnderſtand him. Neither doe the ſtrict rulers of Theologie abſolutely take away all kindes of *Perturbations* from the minde of man, for as *Saint Auguſtine* ſaith, the cittizens of the holy and heavenly city do feare, deſire, grieue, and reioyce, and yet becauſe their loue is right, they haue alſo their affections vpright.

*Cicero lib. 4.
Tuſcu queſt.*

*Ariſt. lib. 2.
Ethic cap. 3.*

*Auguſt.
de Ciuitate
Dei.*

Likeviſe the heroicall vertues as *fortitude* and *magnanimities* haue ſome of the *Perturbations* of the minde, as their inſtrumēt for the objects of them as honor, glory, & victory are never obtained or attempted but thorow the proſecutiō of ſome of thoſe *Perturbations*. But leaſt our meaning might be miſtaken, and that ſome ſhould ſuppoſe that we goe about to allow al the *Perturbations* of the minde as either neceſſary or tollerable, we will diſtinguiſh of *Perturbations*, and conſider of their courſe either in reſpect of the ſubiect, in which they are, or the objects, about which they are cōverſant, & the end, to which they tend. The ſubiects, in which they are, are of two ſorts: Firſt *Creatures wanting Reason*, as beaſts, which by naturall inſtinct doe feare that which may be hurtful vnto their kind, & they deſire that, which is for the preſervation of their kinde. And in them theſe *Perturbations* are not againſt Reason, although the ſubiects, in which theſe *Perturbations* are, be voide of Reason. But the *Stoicks* affirme that there are no *Perturbations* in beaſtes, yet the *Peripateticks* and the *Academicks* alleage the contrary, that beaſtes haue by Nature a proanes to pleaſure and griefe, to loſe and ha-

tried

tred, following and forsaking: all which are properly called Perturbations. The next *subiect*, in which these Perturbations are, may be Man himselfe, and the Perturbations, wherewith he is possessed, may be either tollerable, or intollerable, according to the *objects*, about which, and the *end*, to which they are directed. And there is some kinde of Perturbations in man not onely voide of Reason, but contrary to Reason. As when a man naturally indued with Reason, doth vsually yelde vnto vnreasonable actions, following his *Concupiscible Appetite* in lust, or the like vaine Pleasures; or else the *Iracible Appetite* in anger, vengeance and the like, being proane through the instigation of these Perturbations to do that, which tendeth vnto the destruction of his owne kinde: and these Perturbations are not onely contrary to Reason, but even altogether raised and blotted out of Reasons bookes. There is an other kinde of Perturbation in man (as it may in some sort so bee called) which yet worketh with, and by Reason, as that Delight, and Ioy, which we take in vertue, and vertuous actions; and that Displeasure & Offence, which we conceiue at the that do vitiously behaue themselves. In this here is Delight, & Displeasure, which are reckoned as Perturbations, and yet the groundes of them proceede from Reason, and worke with Reason, or at the least, not contrary to Reason.

Now next for the number of the Perturbations, they haue bin alwaies left vncertaine, and not agreed vpon. For *Plato* would haue them to be innumerable, when as he doth call the *Concupiscible Appetite*, a *beast of many heads*. For it cōtaineth desire, delight, loue, pleasure, and others almost infinite. *Cicero* according to the opinion of the *Stoicks* affirmeth that there are foure first heades of the Perturbations, vnder which the rest are placed, as *griefe, feare, wy, and lusts*. He saith in that place that there are cōtained vnder *griefe*, Envie, Emulation, Oblectatiō, Bewailing, Carefulness, Affliction, Desperation and such like. Vnder *feare* he putteth Slouth, Shame, Terror, Astonishment, and the like. Vnder *pleasure* he placeth Delectation, Desire, and many other, so that he setteth downe no certaine number of the Perturbations,

*Plato de Res-
pub. li. 9.*

*Cicero lib. 4.
Tuscul.*

ons, although he alloweth, as it were certaine roots, out of which the rest should spring but yet most do cōsent, that there are two foundations or fountaines, from whence the rest of the Perturbations doe proceede; that is, the *Concupiscible* and the *Irafcible* Appetites: the Perturbations following the *Concupiscible Appetite*, are loue, hatred, desire, delectation, and sorow: so likewise the Perturbations which appertaine to the *Irafcible Appetite*, are hope, desperation, feare, boldnes, disdain, presumption, and the like.

Then as concerning the course of these two principall rootes of Perturbation with their particular baranches, if thou wouldst know how they doe come or make entrance into the Minde of man, and thereby way with thy selfe, *What manner of man thou art therein*, know that there is no man liuing absolutely free and cleare from all these Perturbations of the Minde, and although some men are more subiect vnto them then others are, yet there is not any, that is not molested with some of them. Notwithstanding, it is more vsuall to men of some age and estate to bee incombred with some particular Perturbations, then to others, Also they are more incident to one sexe then to an other. Likewise they come to some by *Nature*, and to other some by *Accident*. As for examplen the *Concupiscible Appetite* with his severall branches is more common, and yet not so continuall as is the *Irafcible*. For to loue, to hate, to desire, to delight, to dislike, are things common to all men, though not at all times. And they come more by *Accident* then by *Nature*. And yet sometimes by both. But the *Irafcible Appetite* with his particular partes doth much possesse many men by *Nature*; as some are from their cradell fearefull: some are by *Nature* angry and washpish; some are alwaies impacient: some are never but presumptuous & the like. As touching the Perturbations proceeding from the *Irafcible Appetite*, some haue affirmed that they come of bote blood, stirred vp about the heart, which doth kindle and inflame the spirites with an imagination of anger & offence. And (as one saith) there are five degrees, by the which men are stirred vp to wrath & anger; the first is, Man against himselfe: the second is man against man: the third is against his superiour power, as Gods: the fourth is against his inferiours, as beastes and other creatures

- 1 without reason: the first is against things without life. As for the first, which is the anger, that man conceiveth against himselfe: it may in some sorte be lawfull and commendable, as when he is angrie with himselfe for his offence committed in doing any dishonest thing: this anger is lawfull, but vvhhen he is angrie with himselfe, because he cannot doe that, which he would, or cannot haue that, which he desireth, being things either impossible or vnprofitable to bee performed, or else vnlawfull or vnmeet to be desired; this kinde of anger is against Reason.
- 2 The next, which is the wrath that one man conceiveth against an other, this may bee either tollerable or intollerable, as the cause thereof is, or as he, which is offended, doth carrie and be-haue himselfe in the course of his wrath: the cause of anger may be such, that to conceale it, were not commendable. For when a mans good name is take away vniustly by a slanderer or back-biter, to conceale this is not commendable: because he that is flaudred, being silent, seemeth to condemne himselfe, yet the anger that is conceived in this case, ought not to extend presently vnto extremity of reuenge. For if the partie moued may be satisfied with the confession of his accuser that he hath wronged him, or that he can otherwise prooue himselfe wronged, whereby the worlde is satisfied, that he was flaudred, his anger ought to be appeased.
- 3 Third kinde of anger, which is of man against his maker, is both irreligious and vnreasonable, and may rather be called *madnes*, then *anger*. For it is like his condition, that throweth stones into the aire vpright, and standeth stil, vntil they fall vpon his owne head. The fourth, which is the anger of man against beastes, is but little more then bestiall, when the vnreasonable creature shalbe angry with the vnreasonable. The
- 4 fifth of man against things without life sheweth that he wanteth that reason, which should be the light of his owne life.
- 5

Somewhat should be saide as concerning the abuse & course of the Concupiscible Appetite, but because we desire to auoide tediousnes, and that the shortnes of time alloweth no large discourse, I will conclude with some shorte precept for the avoiding of these two perillous *Appetites* of the mind, which are the Iraicible and the Concupiscible Appetite. Therefore if thou

vvide

wilt shunne those two so cruell adversaries vnto a cōtēred mind, as are the Concupiscible and Irascible Appetite, thou must first learne *what manner of man thou art in suffering or in suppressing of those Appetites of the minde*; thou must call vnto thy remembrance & knowledg the vse of *Intellectual, Morall & Theological Vertues*.

Next in place (but before in operation & effect) are the *Morall* vertues, which do incline and invite men to do things honest and lawfull: these do helpe much to quiet the Perturbations of the minde & to make a man know vwhat manner of man he is. But especially the fowre Morall vertues, which are called Cardinall vertues, do much further the conquering of those Passions: as *Temperance, Prudence, Fortitude and Iustice*. They are called Cardinall vertues, a *Cardine*, signifying the *hinge of a doore*: because as on the hinde the gate is turned, shut and opened; so the heart of man, which is the hinde of the doore in doing all good actions, is opened to things honest, & shut against things dishonest by force of these vertues. And although those fowre, called the Cardinal vertues, be of greatest force, yet al the rest do serue in some sort to governe the Perturbations of the Minde, and to make a man know what manner of man he is: As *Magnificence, Magnanimity, Liberality, Modesty, Mansuetude, Verbitie, Affabilitie*. Whereof some do respect the body with the Minde, some do direct the Minde most.

Those, vvhich require the bodies assistance (although they haue wholly the mindes direction) are *Fortitude* and *Magnanimity*: some belong vnto the government of the senses as *Temperance* vnto the two senses of *Touching* and *Tasting*. But *Continence* appertaineth to the moderating of all the senses. Some others doe serue for direction of manners, as *Affabilitie* in vvords or speech, *Verbitie* or civility in deedes. So by the helpe of those Morall vertues thou maiest learne to master the Perturbations of the Minde appertaining either to the Cōcupiscible or Irascible Appetite. For by *Fortitude* thou maiest overcome *Fear*; by *Mansuetude* thou maiest conquere *Impatience, anger*, & such like; by *Temperance* and *Continence* thou maiest subdue *Immoderate desires*, as lust and such other like passions and Perturbations of the minde, vvhere vvith men are much overwhelmed, Yet be-

Christ. lib. 2. cause *Vertue* is saide to bee a *mediocrity* betwixt two vices having
Lib. the *excesse* on the one side, and the *defect* on the other; howv hard then
it is alwaies to keepe the *Meane* and not to fall on either side, e-
very man may easily see and know. For as we see travellers, who
haue a long iorney to make, sometimes doe meete with many
waies in one place, some turning on the right hand, some on the
left, and others going out-right: yet of all these waies there is but
one, which is the right vway, and that often seemes to be the vn-
likeliest way, when that, which leadeth to his iournies end, is not
so beaten a way, nor so much bending (as the passenger perswa-
ded himselfe) vnto his right course: to fareth it with them that
travell in the tedious iourney of this life: the world is our high
vway, which hath in it many by-pathes, & the poore passingers,
that travel therein, are diuers times distracted, & in much doubt
for the choice of their way. For the fairest way in appearance is
Xenoph. lib. not alwaies (nay it is seldome) the right way: & the wrong waies
1. 2. Ped. 1. 2. are much more beaten and much more easie to finde then the
true way. For if a man wil follow the foote steps of others exam-
ples, he shal finde a broad-beaten path, which is commonly the
vvorst, and the vvrong vway. It is not the mediocrity, but it is the
vway that leadeth vnto the excelsse, or to the defect. Therefore
since it is so hard a matter to finde the right way in conquering
the Perturbations of the minde, it behoueth every man (if hee
will be master ouer his owne Affections) to cal vnto his aide (be-
sides the *Intellectuall* & *Morall* vertues before named) the *Theo-*
logical vertues, which are *Faith*, *Charitie*, *Pietie*, *Patiens*, and the
like: by the power whereof (and the permission and assistance of
him that graunteth them) he may wel manage his owne minde,
and all the Perturbations thereof. But because the consideratio
hereof appertaineth to the knowledge of those things, *that are*
above, it must be left vnto that last point of Consideration.

In the meane time thou maiest (by that little which hath bin
here laid downe) learne somewhat concerning the knowledge of
thy selfe (which is the first of the fowre principall pointes of Con-
sideration) and in this thou hast seene somewhat, *what, who, and*
what manner of man thou art.

FINIS.

